Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes by Sterk, Stewart E.
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law 
LARC @ Cardozo Law 
Articles Faculty 
2011 
Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes 
Stewart E. Sterk 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, sterk@yu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes, 91 Boston University Law 
Review 227 (2011). 
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/303 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, 
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu. 
STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO SETTLEMENT OF 
LAND USE DISPUTES 
STEWART E. STERK* 
INTRODUCTION ........ ... .......... .. ........... . ........ . .......... . .. ...... .... ........... ... ........... .. . 228 
I. THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEM .. ..... .......... . ................................ . .. ............ 231 
A. Standing ... .... ...... ... .. ....... ...... ................... .... .... .... .... ........ ............. 234 
B. Grounds for Upsetting a Settlement .. ......... .... ....... ...... ......... ....... 236 
1. Contract Zoning ... .... .......... ....... ..... .. ......... ... .. ..... .. ... ... ........... 236 
2. Failure to Comply with Statutory Procedures ....................... 238 
3. Substantive Challenges to the Settlement Agreement.. ......... 240 
C. Preclusion Principles ... ...... .......... .... ........ .. ... ........ ... .......... ... ... ... 242 
D. Impact on Settlement .. .. ........ ........................ ... ........ ............. ..... .. 244 
II. INTEGRATING SETTLEMENT INTO PREVAILING MODELS OF LAND 
USE LAW ... ... ............ . ........................................... ............. .. ........... ..... 245 
A. The "Plan" Model ......... ............... ........ .. ...... ........... .. ..... ... .......... 246 
B. The Public Choice Model ............... .. ........................................... 248 
C. The Mediation Model ........ ........... ........................ ....................... 250 
D. The Role of Settlement Restrictions Within the Models ...... .. ....... 253 
1. Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Developer 
Capture ...................... .. ... .. ....... ........ ................ ................... 254 
2. Settlement Restrictions as a Protection Against 
Uninformed Decisions ....... .. ..... ......... ... ....... ..... ............... ..... . 255 
3. Settlement Restrictions as a Mechanism for Assuring 
Participation .. .......... ............................... ....... .. .......... ..... ........ 257 
4. Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Neighbor 
Capture .................... ... ....... .. ........ ........... ................. ........... 257 
5. Summary ........ .. .......... ..................................... ............. ......... 259 
III. POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT STRUCTURES .... .. ............. ... .......... ..... ... ....... 259 
A . Dispensing with All Doctrinal Restrictions .... ......... ........... ....... .. 260 
B. The Representation-Reinforcing Approach: Public 
Hearings as a Safeguard ....... ... .... ... ..... .. ..................................... 263 
C. Judicial Approval: The "Consent Decree " Approach .. .............. 265 
D. The Participation Approach ................................ ........ ................ 267 
CONCLUSION ........................................... . ............ . ........ .. ........................ . ....... 271 
• Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This article benefited 
from helpful comments at the Property Works in Progress Conference and at a Colloquium 
at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. Emily Bayer-Pacht and Brian 
Steinwascher provided invaluable research assistance. 
227 
228 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 227 
INTRODUCTION 
Land use litigation pervades the dockets of state and federal courts. State 
supreme courts, for instance, routinely confront critical issues of constitutional 
principle, including the scope of governmental power to take private property. 1 
But state supreme courts also hear mundane disputes between landowners and 
municipalities about excessive pet-keeping, 2 inadequate setbacks, 3 and docks 
that interfere with the views of neighbors.4 In a culture as litigious as ours, it 
should not be surprising that landowners or their neighbors sue municipalities 
when they are aggrieved by land use decisions. What is remarkable is that so 
many controversies - major and minor - are litigated to final judgment, and 
often reach appellate courts. In a universe where the overwhelming majority 
of cases filed end with settlement rather than judgment, land use cases tend not 
to settle. 
Settling a land use case is difficult for a variety of reasons. First, unlike 
civil actions in which plaintiff seeks a sum of money from defendant, land use 
cases do not typically present an unlimited array of obvious compromise 
solutions. If a landowner wants a variance to permit construction of two 
homes on a lot zoned for one, there is little middle ground for settlement of 
litigation resulting from the municipality's decision on the permit. Second, 
because municipal officials are politically accountable to their constituents, 
they may choose to avoid the political heat they would generate by settling 
with an unpopular developer - preferring to hide behind judicial resolution of 
controversial issues. Legal doctrine bears little responsibility for either of 
these settlement obstacles; legal rules have little effect on the number of 
compromise solutions or the political instinct to avoid controversial decisions. 
Legal doctrine, however, does bear a close relation to other obstacles to 
settlement of land use cases. Broad standing rules often permit neighbors, 
community groups, and other governmental entities to challenge any 
1 See, e.g., Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 170-72 (N.Y. 
2009). 
2 See Luper v. City of Wasilla, 215 P.3d 342, 344 (Alaska 2009). 
3 Moon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Madison, 966 A.2d 722, 725-27 (Conn. 2009). 
4 Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 680 S.E.2d 411 , 412 (Ga. 2009). 
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settlement. 5 Zoning law also provides a variety of grounds, both procedural 
and substantive, on which to attack any settlement. 6 
Suppose a municipality rezones property over the objection of an affected 
landowner, or denies the landowner a special permit or a variance. If the 
landowner then brings an action against the municipality challenging the 
municipality's decision, what power does the municipality's counsel have to 
settle the litigation? The municipality will typically have to offer one of two 
concessions to settle: money paid to the plaintiff landowner or some relaxation 
of the use restrictions imposed on the plaintiff landowner's land. The structure 
of zoning law does not limit the municipality's power to make payments to the 
landowner, but it does inhibit the municipality's power to make a settlement 
offer that changes the restrictions imposed on plaintiffs land. 
First, in many jurisdictions, any settlement will require the formal approval 
of one or more municipal bodies. 7 Whether the settlement requires the local 
legislative body to amend the zoning ordinance, a zoning board of appeals to 
issue a special permit or variance, or a local planning board to issue site plan 
approval, these formal approvals will typically involve public hearings and 
ultimately a public vote. In many jurisdictions, the approval will also require 
the approving body to make findings to support its determination. 
Second, even if the settlement receives formal approval, neighbors may 
have standing to challenge that approval. 8 The challenge might rest on 
procedural grounds if the approving body has departed from statutory 
procedures in order to expedite the settlement. But even if the approving body 
has dotted all of its i's and crossed all of its t's, neighbors might be able to 
challenge the approval on substantive grounds, contending that the approval 
constituted "spot zoning" or was arbitrary or capricious in violation of state 
law, or on a variety of other grounds.9 
The prospect of further municipal approvals and neighbor litigation reduces 
the attractiveness of settlement to developers. From the developer's 
perspective, time is money, and a principal reason to settle pending litigation is 
to speed up the development process. To the extent that these structural 
hurdles entail delay, they make litigation to judgment relatively more attractive 
5 See, e.g., 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 964 A.2d 662, 672-73 (Md. 
2009) (concluding that a landowner in close proximity to development has standing to 
challenge land use decision and that the municipality has the burden of proving that a 
landowner in close proximity is not aggrieved for standing purposes); Save the Pine Bush, 
Inc. v. Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917, 918, 921 (N.Y. 2009) (ruling that even 
persons who do not own land in close proximity and the organizations to which they belong 
have standing to challenge land use decision that would affect a natural resource if the 
landowner or organization "can prove that he or she uses and enjoys a natural resource more 
than most other members of the public"). 
6 See infra Part I. 
1 See infra Part I.B.2. 
8 See infra Part I.A. 
9 See infra Part I.B.3. 
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than settlement. Compared to settlements, judgments will typically provide 
more insulation from neighbor challenges. 
From the perspective of the parties in the midst of litigation, this appears to 
be a lose-lose situation. Both the municipality and the developer would prefer 
to settle the litigation on terms that reduce the impact of the proposed 
development rather than incurring the costs, risks, and delays inherent in 
continuing to litigate. 10 Even the neighbors ( who are also municipal taxpayers) 
will often benefit from a settlement rather than continued litigation that could 
result in a complete victory for the developer. From this perspective, 
streamlining the settlement process to overcome structural obstacles would 
appear to be an attractive reform. 
There is, however, another side to the story. The doctrines that interfere 
with settlement may also serve significant land use objectives. First, they 
might discipline municipal officials, reducing the risk of regulatory capture by 
developers II or neighbors. 12 Second, some of these doctrines - particularly 
10 Moreover, settlement may avoid social costs - of providing judges and courtrooms -
as well as private costs to the litigant. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why 
Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 221 , 259 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the 
Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 602-04 
(1997). 
On the other hand, when cases are litigated to judgment, the resulting precedent may 
reduce legal uncertainty, and therefore the volume of future controversies, a benefit parties 
are not likely to factor into their settlement calculus. Similarly, litigation to judgment may 
assist in the development of social norms. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (comment) (emphasizing the role of courts in giving effect to public 
values). Shavell, however, suggests that these benefits of litigation are overstated because, 
in a world where so few cases go to trial , the marginal social value of an additional trial for 
law clarification or norm development is likely to be small. See Shaven, supra, at 595-96, 
606. 
11 Neighbor standing, public hearing requirements, and doctrines that give neighbors a 
cause of action against the municipality make it more difficult for municipal officials to 
capitulate to the demands of politically influential developers. 
12 In the absence of structural obstacles to settlement, one might fear that municipalities 
would enact regulations designed to not take account of externalities a proposed 
development might produce, but instead to extract public benefits unrelated to those 
externalities - a practice the Supreme Court tried to limit in No/Ian v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 838-42 (1987) (holding that an easement condition placed on a 
beachfront property owner' s permit - designed to provide lateral access across the beach -
exceeded the coastal commission ' s power because the condition was unrelated to the 
justification for requiring the permit). Consider Trancas Property Owners Ass 'n v. City of 
Malibu, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (Ct. App. 2006), in which the court set aside a settlement 
agreement at the behest of objecting neighbors. Id. at 202. After about twenty years of 
unsuccessful efforts to obtain approval of a subdivision, the developer sued to enjoin the 
city from disapproving subdivision maps filed by the developer. Id. at 202-03 . While the 
litigation was pending, the city and the developer "agreed to settle" the litigation on terms 
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public hearing and environmental review requirements - may operate to 
generate information that improves the quality of land use decisions. Third, 
the same doctrines that increase the information available to decision makers 
may also operate to promote participation in the land use process, generating 
greater public acceptance of controversial decisions. 
These defenses of doctrines that make settlement difficult do not, however, 
rely on the importance of judicial resolution of land use controversies. Judicial 
review (or the prospect of judicial review) may increase the likelihood that 
municipal officials will better identify and account for the interests of parties 
affected by controversial land use decisions. But as long as final judicial 
resolution of land use disputes is not an end in itself, it should be possible to 
streamline doctrine to permit easier, quicker, and cheaper settlement without 
sacrificing the quality or legitimacy of land use decisions. 
Part I of this Article explores the obstacles to settlement presented by 
current legal doctrine. Part II demonstrates that those obstacles serve few 
critical functions within the traditional "plan" model of land use regulation or 
within a public choice model of land use regulation. By contrast, they do play 
a significant role within a more modem model that treats municipal officials as 
mediators of land use conflicts. Part III examines alternatives to the current 
approach, and suggests that a regime that bars potential objectors from 
challenging a settlement unless they participated in the litigation that generated 
the settlement would retain the primary advantages of current restrictions on 
settlement - without the current costs. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEM 
A concrete example illustrates the doctrinal issues surrounding settlement of 
zoning litigation. Consider a variant on the facts of Westchester Day School v. 
Village of Mamaroneck, 13 decided by the Second Circuit in 2007. A private 
that required the developer to dedicate to the city 26.5 acres in exchange for approval of a 
map permitting 32 units on the developer's remaining 8.5 acres. Id. at 204. If the city had 
imposed the dedication of 26.5 acres as a condition of obtaining development approvals, the 
city's exaction would have required both a "nexus" to the reasons for withholding 
development approval and "rough proportionality" to the harms the development might 
impose on the community. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("[A] term 
such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement .... 
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent 
to the impact of the proposed development."); Nol/an, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[T]he lack ofnexus 
between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that 
purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the 
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation."). But if the Trancas court had held the settlement binding, the city would 
have escaped the need to satisfy the standards articulated in Nol/an and Dolan. 
13 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Orthodox Jewish day school sought to expand its operation. 14 Under the 
village zoning ordinance, the expansion required a special permit from the 
village's zoning board of appeals, an administrative body empowered to 
consider applications for variances and special permits. 15 Westchester Day 
School applied for the permit, 16 and provided the requisite notice to 
neighboring landowners.17 Many neighbors expressed their opposition to the 
proposed expansion. 18 The zoning board of appeals denied the permit, citing 
traffic and other concerns. 19 
Westchester Day School then brought an action in federal district court, 
contending that the permit denial violated both the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)20 and state law.21 The action sought 
the permit, damages, and attorneys' fees.22 
Suppose the village attorney, faced with this action, consulted with the 
village board of trustees, the village's elected governing body, and suggested 
that settlement would be in the village's interest.23 Suppose further that she 
proposed offering to permit the day school to complete a somewhat modified 
expansion in return for dropping all claims against the village. Suppose also 
that both the village board of trustees and the day school found the terms of the 
proposed settlement more attractive than continuing the litigation. Would the 
parties settle? 
14 Id. at 344-45. 
15 Id. at 344. 
16 Id. at 345. 
17 See Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 510 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
18 Id. at 510-11. 
19 Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346. 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006) (protecting freedom of religion in prisons and 
under zoning laws). 
21 The procedural history of the case was, in fact, somewhat more complicated. The Day 
School initially brought suit challenging the zoning board of appeals issuance of a "positive 
declaration" under the state's environmental statute, which would have required preparation 
ofan environmental impact statement. Westchester Day Sch., 417 F. Supp. 2d at 512. That 
challenge was premised both on RLUIPA and on state law. Id. at 483. When the village 
subsequently denied the permit application, the Day School amended its complaint to focus 
on RLUIPA and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (authorizing federal courts to 
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions"). 
Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 346. 
22 See Westchester Day Sch., 417 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73 ( ordering board to issue the 
permit, but reserving judgment on "plaintiff's prayer for damages and attorneys' fees 
pending appellate review"). 
23 In fact, the village ultimately settled with the Day School after the Second Circuit's 
decision, agreeing to pay the school $4.75 million to avoid a potential damage award that 
could have been significantly higher. Juli S. Charkes, Mamaroneck and School Settle 
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at WE2. 
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Prevailing models of the settlement process assume that settlement costs are 
typically lower than litigation costs, and that parties generally settle disputes 
unless their estimates of the likely litigation outcomes are widely disparate.24 
Of course, as the cost of settlement rises relative to the cost of litigation, the 
parties to a dispute become more likely to litigate, even if their estimates of 
litigation success are similar. 25 At the limit, if settlement costs exceed 
litigation costs, risk neutral parties generally should litigate rather than settle 
even if they have identical estimates of the litigation outcome. 26 
From the perspective of the day school, two potential settlement costs might 
make litigation look attractive, even if the parties shared similar assessments of 
the litigation outcome. First, procedural requirements for finalizing the 
settlement might entail delay. Second, any risk that the settlement would not 
be enforceable increases the effective cost of settlement and makes settlement 
less attractive. These costs, in turn, increase the concessions the day school 
would want from the village before foregoing litigation, making settlement less 
attractive to the village and its attorney. 
These problems are far from hypothetical.27 Lake County Trust Co. v. 
Advisory Plan Commission,28 decided in 2009 by the Indiana Supreme Court, 
furnishes a recent real-world illustration. After the plan commission 
disapproved a developer's subdivision application, the developer sought 
judicial review.29 The trial court, pursuant to Indiana's alternative dispute 
resolution rules, ordered mediation of the dispute.30 The plan commission 
granted its lawyers full authority to settle the dispute,31 and the mediation 
resulted in a written settlement that the commission agreed to approve at its 
24 The classic treatment of settlement is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Priest and Klein assumed 
explicitly that litigation costs are greater than settlement costs. Id. at 13. On their 
assumptions, the likelihood that a dispute will be litigated increases when the difference in 
the parties' probability estimates of the outcome of litigation increases. Id. at 16. As 
another article puts it: 
[S]ettlement efforts will fail, and adjudication will result, only when (1) the plaintiff 
and defendant have different estimates of the expected value of litigation, (2) the 
plaintiffs estimate is higher than the defendant 's, and (3) the two estimates differ by 
more than the combined transaction costs (and risk-aversion effects) of the parties. 
Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 8 (2002) 
(summarizing the traditional approach to settlement). 
25 See Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 20. 
26 See id. 
27 For a case upsetting settlement of a RLUIPA challenge - much like the one in 
Westchester Day School - see League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los 
Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007), discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-79. 
28 904 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 2009). 
29 Id. at 1275. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1279. 
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next meeting. 32 Despite the agreement, the plan commission voted to defer 
consideration of the subdivision, and ultimately rejected the plan.33 After 
deferral and before rejection, the developer filed a motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement.34 Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
commission lacked the power to delegate settlement authority to its lawyer 
because Indiana law required final approval of any subdivision plat "by a 
majority of the commission members at meetings subject to the Open Door 
Law."35 
Lake County Trust reduces the incentive for developers to mediate or settle 
in Indiana, and similar decisions generate the same disincentives in other 
states.36 Lake County Trust involved the relatively unusual - but not unique -
situation in which the municipality reneged on its own agreement. The 
problem is exacerbated in many jurisdictions because a variety of parties might 
have standing to challenge the settlement on any of several different grounds. 
This Section first examines standing to challenge a settlement, and turns then 
to the grounds on which a settlement might be upset. 
A. Standing 
Multiple parties may have standing to challenge a settlement. First, the 
municipality itself may have standing to upset a settlement agreement. A 
municipality may challenge a settlement when there has been a change in 
municipal administration after the settlement, but a municipal challenge can 
also arise when political pressure causes local officials to change their mind 
about the wisdom of the settlement. For example, in Martin v. City of 
Greenville,37 the city and the landowner reached a compromise agreement 
settling the landowner's action to declare the city's zoning ordinance 
unconstitutional as applied to the landowner's parcel.38 Subsequently, the 
landowner sought to enforce the settlement agreement, but the city successfully 
argued that the agreement was invalid because the city lacked legal authority to 
make the agreement. 39 
32 Id. at 1275. 
33 Id. at 1276. 
34 Id. at 1275-76. 
35 Id. at 1279. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated a lower court's award of sanctions 
against the plan commission. Id. at 1275, 1280. The trial court, however, had ordered the 
plan commission to approve the subdivision, and the commission did not appeal from that 
aspect of the trial court's order. Id. at 1279 n.2. Nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court 's 
opinion, which permits a subsequent commission to renege on a negotiated or mediated 
settlement without sanction, generates a disincentive to settlement in future cases. 
36 See infra notes 37-90 and accompanying text. 
37 369 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
38 Id. at 544. 
39 Id. at 546. 
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Second, in some states local governmental authority is sufficiently 
fragmented that even if the municipality's elected governing body agrees to 
settle a land use dispute, another governmental body will have standing to 
challenge the settlement. New York furnishes a prime example. In Commco, 
Inc. v. Amelkin,40 the Court of Appeals held that a town's zoning board of 
appeals - a body appointed by the elected town board - had standing to 
challenge a stipulation of settlement authorized by the town board and entered 
into by the town board's special counsel and the landowner.41 The court 
emphasized that the zoning board of appeals, whose variance denial had 
triggered the litigation and subsequent settlement, "is a separate entity whose 
members serve with statutory powers and for statutorily specified periods of 
time."42 The court also rejected the town board's argument that giving the 
zoning board of appeals control over litigation and settlement could force the 
town board "to finance frivolous appeals . . . to the possible fiscal ruination of 
the town. "43 
Third, neighbors often have standing to challenge settlements between the 
municipality and a developer. In most jurisdictions, if a municipality grants a 
variance44 or rezones land,45 immediate neighbors have standing to challenge 
the variance or the zoning amendment. Perhaps because of this established 
40 465 N.E.2d 314 (N.Y. 1984). 
41 Id. at 316-17. The dispute initially arose when the zoning board of appeals denied the 
landowner's application for a use variance that would have permitted conversion of "an 
abandoned school building into a home for senior citizens." Id. at 315. When the 
landowner challenged the zoning board' s decision, the trial court annulled the variance 
denial, and the town appealed. Id. While the case was on appeal, the town appointed 
special counsel and authorized settlement discussions, which ultimately resulted in the 
settlement. Id. at 315-16. The zoning board of appeals, whose determination the landowner 
had challenged, was not a party to the stipulation of settlement. Id. at 316. 
42 Id. at 317. The relevant statute - today and at the time of the court's decision - also 
provides that the town board can only remove members of the zoning board of appeals after 
a public hearing and for cause. N.Y. TOWN LAW§ 267(9) (McKinney Supp. 2010); see also 
Commco, Inc., 465 N .E.2d at 317. 
43 Id. at 316. Three judges dissented from the court' s conclusions. Id. at 319-22 (Meyer, 
J. , dissenting) (arguing that the town board should not be deemed subordinate to the zoning 
board on a procedural technicality). Other courts have suggested a similar result. Thus, in 
Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), a challenge to a 
settlement brought by neighboring landowners, the court emphasized that the zoning board 
was not a party to the suit, even though deviation from density standards are typically 
granted by the zoning board. Id. at 664-65 . 
44 See, e.g., John John, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 790 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501-02 
(App. Div. 2005) (holding that an adjacent landowner who raised concerns "within the zone 
of interest to be protected" had standing to challenge the board's approval of a development 
and variance). 
45 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 591 (Neb. 2005) (concluding 
that an adjacent landowner has standing to object to rezoning if the landowner shows some 
"special injury"). 
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doctrine, cases in which neighbors challenge settlement agreements rarely even 
discuss the standing issue. Thus, in Trancas Property Owners Ass 'n v. City of 
Malibu,46 a California court, at the behest of a neighboring property owners 
association, set aside a settlement agreement that would have permitted the 
developer to build thirty-two homes while dedicating an adjacent tract to the 
city.47 Neither the developer, nor the trial court that upheld the agreement, nor 
the appellate court that invalidated it, suggested that the association lacked 
standing.48 Even in cases where courts ultimately sustain a settlement against a 
neighbor challenge, neighbor standing is often assumed.49 
B. Grounds for Upsetting a Settlement 
Standing to challenge a settlement agreement would not, by itself, be a 
significant obstacle to settlement if no grounds were available for upsetting the 
settlement. Litigants have, however, successfully advanced a number of 
grounds for upsetting settlements. 
I. Contract Zoning 
When a municipality extracts concessions from a landowner in return for a 
municipal promise to rezone land, a number of courts have invalidated the 
resulting zoning amendment as impermissible "contract zoning."50 Those 
courts have articulated a number of reasons for the prohibition on contract 
zoning. Some have invoked the "reserved powers" doctrine and argued that a 
municipality may not contract away its power to legislate in the public 
interest. 51 On this theory, a contract to rezone improperly constrains legislative 
discretion. Other courts have focused instead on the theory that contract 
zoning impermissibly applies special rules to benefit some developers, but not 
others.52 
46 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (Ct. App. 2006). 
47 Id. at 202, 204. 
48 Id. at 200; see also League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los 
Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007); Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358, 
1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Warner, 644 A.2d at 658-59, 665-66. 
49 See, e.g., Murphy v. City of W. Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221, 222-25 (Ark. 2003); 
Brownsboro Rd. Area Def., Inc. v. McClure, No. 2002-CA-002559-MR, 2004 WL 1909337, 
at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2004) (validating settlement agreement over the objections of a 
neighborhood organization, a business, a church, and four individual residents who were 
allowed to intervene in the original action "without conditions or limitations"). 
50 See, e.g., Hale v. Osborn Coal Enters., Inc., 729 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1997); Dacyv. Viii. ofRuidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 794, 798 (N.M. 1992). 
51 See, e.g., Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564, 566-67 (Ala. 1972) (dismissing 
appellant's contract zoning argument because the zoning requirements did not "control or 
embarrass the legislative prerogatives of the city"). 
52 See, e.g., Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 642-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) ("'[I]f each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter 
2011] LAND USE DISPUTES 237 
Almost all academics criticize contract zoning doctrine.53 Scholars (and 
practitioners) recognize that individually tailored "deals" are often the most 
effective mechanism for harmonizing competing private interests.54 And 
scholars have also noted that courts have selectively enforced the prohibition 
on contract zoning by developing fine (and often unsupportable) distinctions 
between prohibited contract zoning and permitted conditional zoning. 55 
Although the prohibition on contract zoning generally appears to be losing 
its doctrinal steam, 56 it remains a ground on which both neighbors and the 
municipality itself can rely in seeking to invalidate agreements designed to 
settle litigation between developers and the municipality. Thus, in Chung v. 
Sarasota County,57 an adjacent owner challenged a settlement agreement 
reached by a landowner and the county in an action disputing the county's 
refusal to rezone the landowner's parcel.58 The settlement required the county 
to rezone the property, subject to stipulations and conditions.59 The court 
agreed with the adjacent owner that the settlement was invalid, concluding that 
into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and 
zoning would collapse."' (quoting Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956) (en 
bane))); Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797 ("Enforcement of such a promise [to zone] allows a 
municipality to circumvent established statutory requirements to the possible detriment of 
affected landowners and the community as a whole."). 
53 See, e.g., Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning that is 
Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 407, 488, 496 
(2004) (highlighting "murky and overlapping" judicial treatment of contract and conditional 
zoning, and suggesting that development agreements - a form of land use bargaining -
should not be treated as invalid contract zoning); Stewart E. Sterk, Publicly Held Servitudes 
in the New Restatement, 27 CONN. L. REv. 157, 172-74 (1994) (discussing the "incoherent 
underpinnings" of contract zoning doctrine); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the 
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical 
Foundations of Government land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv. 957, 979-80 (1987) 
(criticizing tendency to apply labels, such as contract zoning, that "suggest a relevant 
theoretical framework but serve primarily to describe ultimate outcomes"); Jennifer G. 
Brown, Note, Concomitant Agreement Zoning: An Economic Analysis, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv 
89, 96-97 (characterizing distinctions between contract and conditional zoning as 
"distinctions without differences"). 
54 See, e.g., Green, supra note 53, at 489-96; Charles L. Siemon, Conditional Zoning in 
Illinois: Beast or Beauty?, 15 N. lLL. U. L. REV 585, 609-10 (1995); Wegner, supra note 53, 
at 984; Brown, supra note 53, at 110. 
55 See, e.g., Green, supra note 53, at 407; Brown, supra note 53, at 96-97. 
56 See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development 
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining/or Public Facilities After 
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 675-76 (2001) ("It is unlikely that courts 
will fall back on the reserved powers clause to invalidate development agreements .... "). 
57 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
58 Id. at 1359. 
59 Id. 
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the county had "contracted away the exercise of its police power, which 
constituted an ultra vires act."60 
In Attman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis,61 the court held that a 
municipality itself can invoke the prohibition on contract zoning to escape 
from a settlement agreement. 62 The landowner brought an action challenging a 
parking requirement imposed by the municipality as a condition for permitting 
the landowner to make active use of basement space.63 The municipality and 
the landowner settled the lawsuit, apparently on terms that reduced the 
landowner's obligation to provide parking.64 The agreement also required 
submission of a new application for a conditional use permit, allegedly as a 
matter of form, but when the landowner filed the application, the city's 
planning and zoning commission concluded that the proposed conditional use 
of the premises was illegal.65 In light of the commission's recommendation, 
the city council held a new hearing and denied the application.66 The 
landowner sought enforcement of the agreement,67 but the court held that the 
city council had no authority to make the agreement, citing the "prohibition 
against contracting away the exercise of the zoning power."68 
2. Failure to Comply with Statutory Procedures 
State statutes typically surround the zoning process with procedural 
safeguards. Before a municipal body may effect any sort of zoning change -
from a comprehensive rezoning to a minor variance - neighboring landowners 
must generally receive notice of the proposed change.69 That notice is 
typically followed by public hearings on the proposed change before the 
60 Id. at 1360; see also Trancas Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Malibu, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
200, 206 (Ct. App. 2006) (invalidating settlement agreement because "it includes 
commitments to take or refrain from regulatory actions regarding the zoning of Trancas' s 
development project, which may not lawfully be undertaken by contract"); cf BPG Real 
Estate Investors-Straw Party II, L.P. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 990 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2010) (invalidating part of a settlement agreement because the court lacked power to 
approve an agreement that permitted development of land that was not the subject of the 
underlying litigation). 
61 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989). 
62 Id. at 1284. 
63 Id. at 1280. 
64 There was a dispute about the precise terms of the agreement. Id. On the court' s view 
that the municipality had no power to reduce parking requirements by contract, the precise 
terms of the agreement were not critical. Id. at 1282. 
65 Id. at 1280-81. 
66 Id. at 1281. 
67 Id. at 1281-82. 
68 Id. at 1284. 
69 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65091 (West 2010) (requiring notice to owners of real 
property "within 300 feet of the real property that is the subject of the hearing"). 
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designated municipal body votes on the change. 70 Some statutes provide an 
opportunity for opponents to seek a public referendum on the change,7 1 while 
other statutes require approval of the proposed change by multiple levels of 
government. 72 Moreover, in an increasing number of states, significant zoning 
changes require environmental review, which often entails time-consuming 
preparation of an environmental impact statement, followed by public hearings 
and fact-finding by the "lead agency" charged with evaluating environmental 
impact. 73 
These statutory mandates have provided fertile ground for challenge to 
settlements that would result in a change in the permitted use of the land. The 
Ninth Circuit's decision in League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. 
City of Los Angeles74 furnishes a recent example. After the City of Los 
Angeles denied a conditional use permit for operation of a synagogue in an 
area zoned for residential uses, the congregation brought an action in federal 
court alleging RLUIP A violations. 75 The city and the congregation settled the 
action on terms that authorized use of the property for worship, subject to 
various restrictions. 76 When neighbors brought an action contending that local 
zoning ordinances denied the city authority to enter into the settlement 
agreement, the Ninth Circuit agreed, emphasizing that the procedure for 
reviewing conditional use permit applications requires public notice, a public 
hearing, a series of factual findings, and potential administrative appeals. 77 
The court held that the city could not allow a use for which the zoning 
ordinance requires a conditional use permit unless the city complied with the 
procedural formalities required by the ordinance.78 Because the city did not 
comply with those formalities, the settlement agreement was invalid and 
unenforceable.79 
70 See, e.g., id. § 65856 (West 2009); id. § 65905. 
7 1 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43 , § 42 (2008), applied in LaBranche v. A.J. Lane & 
Co., 537 N.E.2d I 19, I 19-20 (Mass. 1989). 
72 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW§ 239-m (McKinney 1999). 
73 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21006 (West 2007) (describing 
environmental review process); N.Y . ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney Supp. 
2010) (detailing process for preparation of environmental impact statement). See generally 
Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New York's Experience 
with SEQRA, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2041 (1992) (discussing the impact of environmental 
review processes for land use review implemented in many states and, in particular, the 
environmental review process in New York). 
74 498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 
15 Id. at 1054. 
16 Id. 
77 Id. at 1054, 1056. 
78 Id. at 1056. 
19 Id. ; see also Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996); Warner Co. v. Sutton, 644 A.2d 656, 664-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
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A settlement agreement is more likely to survive challenge by neighbors if 
the agreement requires the developer to apply to the relevant municipal boards, 
who will then satisfy all statutory requirements. 80 But, of course, such a 
settlement agreement is of less value to the developer because of the 
uncertainty and delay it entails. Moreover, some courts have suggested that 
even a contingent settlement agreement would be invalid because of the 
pressure municipal officials would feel to act in accordance with the settlement 
agreement. 81 
3. Substantive Challenges to the Settlement Agreement 
Because municipalities are not themselves sovereign entities, their power to 
regulate land use, like most of their other powers, is rooted in state statutes and 
constitutions. As a result, landowners or neighbors can challenge zoning 
decisions made by the municipality's governing body as inconsistent with state 
enabling legislation, even if the municipality has followed all statutory 
procedures. In those states that have enacted a version of the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA),82 landowners can challenge a regulation on the 
ground that it fails to satisfy the statutory mandate that regulations be "[f]or the 
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the 
comrnunity"83 or on the ground that the regulation is inconsistent with the 
statutory directive that "regulations shall be made in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan."84 Neighbors more often focus on the comprehensive 
plan requirement. 85 A claim that the challenged regulation constitutes 
impermissible "spot zoning"86 is a variant of the comprehensive plan claim. 
80 See, e.g., Brownsboro Rd. Area Def., Inc. v. McClure, No. 2002-CA-002559-MR, 
2004 WL 1909337, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2004). 
81 See Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360. 
82 The SZEA was first published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1924 
as a model for use by state legislatures seeking to confer on municipalities the power to 
zone. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT explanatory notes 1, 14 (Advisory Comm. 
on Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE 
210 app. A, at 210, 212 {Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968). 
83 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT§ 1 (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep't 
of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE 210 app. A, at 212 
(Tentative Draft No. I, 1968) (footnotes omitted). Courts also may invalidate regulations 
that do not promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare on substantive due process 
grounds. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928); Twigg v. 
County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745-46 (111. App. Ct. 1994). 
84 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT§ 3 (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S . Dep' t 
of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEY. CODE 210 app. A, at 214-15 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968); see, e.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 560 
(Alaska 2008). 
85 Neighbors typically challenge municipal decisions that relax regulations on a 
landowner's parcel. Because the parcel remains subject to some regulation, and the 
neighbors prefer the remaining restrictions to none, it typically will not be in the neighbor's 
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Because most courts take a deferential approach to local zoning decisions, 
comprehensive plan challenges and spot zoning challenges are generally 
unsuccessful.87 Resolution of the challenges, however, is often time-
consuming. Moreover, in states that take a less deferential approach to 
piecemeal zoning changes, these challenges stand a reasonable chance of 
success.88 
BPG Real Estate Investors-Straw Party II, L.P. v. Board of Supervisors89 
illustrates the problem. A neighbor challenged a settlement agreement as 
impermissible spot zoning.90 Although an appellate court ultimately rejected 
the neighbor's challenge on the merits,91 the very fact that an appellate court 
considered the issue demonstrates that spot zoning doctrine offers potential for 
upsetting a settlement agreement. Similarly, if a zoning amendment, 
conditional use permit, or variance would be subject to invalidation on any 
other substantive ground, it would appear that a settlement agreement 
conferring comparable rights on a landowner should be subject to attack on the 
interest to contend that the restrictions do not promote health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare. 
86 See, e.g., Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 387-88 (Iowa 1994). 
87 The tradition of deference to local zoning decisions started with Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where Justice Sutherland wrote: "If the validity of 
the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be allowed to control." Id. at 388. For a more recent justification of judicial 
deference, see Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468-69 (7th Cir. 
1988) (emphasizing electoral check on power oflocal zoning officials). For criticism of the 
deferential approach, see, for example, Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the 
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1-3 (1992). 
88 Illinois has often been cited as a state with a less deferential approach to local zoning 
decisions. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodijication of "Nature's Metropolis": The 
Historical Context of Illinois ' Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 528-30, 
580-82 (1992) (explaining the principles on which Illinois courts repeatedly base land use 
decisions, which do not always favor local governments). There are signs, however, that the 
Illinois Supreme Court is becoming more deferential toward local zoning determinations. 
See, e.g., Napleton v. Viii. of Hinsdale, 891 N.E.2d 839, 850-51 (Ill. 2008) (concluding that 
language in prior cases requiring that zoning have a "substantial relation" to advancement of 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare should not be read to require more than 
rational basis scrutiny). 
89 990 A.2d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). 
90 Id. at 149-50. In BPG, after the landowner challenged conditions the board of 
supervisors had imposed on the grant of a conditional use application, the court permitted a 
neighbor to intervene. Id. at 143. The landowner and the board then negotiated a settlement 
over the objection of the neighbor, and the trial court approved the settlement over a number 
of objections advanced by the neighbors, including spot zoning and contract zoning 
objections. Id. at 144. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did upset the settlement 
agreement in part, holding that the settlement impermissibly granted development approvals 
for land not included within the scope of the landowner's initial application. Id. at 149. 
91 Id. at 151. 
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same ground. So long as a neighbor would have standing to challenge an 
ordinary zoning action on a substantive ground, a change in the procedure by 
which the municipality reached its decision would appear to have little bearing 
on the merits of the substantive attack. 
C. Preclusion Principles 
Courts do not invariably uphold the right of neighbors to challenge 
settlements. Some courts have upheld settlements by holding that a neighbor's 
failure to intervene in the action between the developer and the municipality 
precludes the neighbor from challenging the settlement of that action. Thus, in 
Cuson v. Tallmadge Charter Township,92 the developer initially sought to 
develop its parcel for multi-family residential use, and when the township 
denied the developer's request to rezone for that purpose, the developer 
brought an action accusing the township of exclusionary zoning.93 That 
litigation resulted in a consent judgment.94 When residential neighbors sought 
to vacate the consent judgment on the ground that it violated statutory 
procedures, the court held that the neighbors' sole remedies were "political in 
nature ... or through the timely intervention in prior proceedings. '">5 Because 
the neighbors had not intervened in the initial proceeding that produced the 
consent judgment, they were precluded from advancing a collateral attack on 
that judgment.96 
The Cuson approach presents some difficult (although not insurmountable) 
conflicts with existing preclusion doctrine. Intervention is not generally 
mandatory. 97 A party's failure to intervene in litigation that might affect its 
92 No. 234157, 2003WL21108470 (Mich. Ct. App. May 15, 2003). 
9Jld.at*l. 
94 The consent judgment provided that the developer would sell part of its parcel to 
another developer, who would build a power plant on the parcel. Id. By the terms of the 
agreement, the township would treat that parcel as if it were zoned for industrial use (thus 
permitting the power plant), even though it was not in fact zoned for such use. Id. 
95 Id. at *4. 
96 Id. at *5; see also Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 1121, 
1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a neighboring property owner could not 
challenge a consent final judgment because it did not intervene in the circuit court 
proceedings); Summit Twp. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Summit Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d 
1263, 1265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (holding that objectors could not appeal a "final and 
binding order" when they did not intervene in the prior appeal of the zoning decision). 
97 In Chase National Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934), Justice Brandeis 
wrote: 
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of 
voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. . . . Unless duly summoned to 
appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment 
recovered therein will not affect his legal rights. 
Id. at 441 (footnote omitted). More recently, the Court cited the Brandeis excerpt with 
approval in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989). 
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interests does not generally preclude the party from asserting its legal rights in 
a subsequent proceeding.98 
This rule reflects the origins and development of intervention doctrine. 99 As 
originally conceived in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a non-party had a 
right to intervene only when the non-party's interests were inadequately 
represented in the litigation and the non-party "[ was or may have been] bound 
by a judgment in the action."100 The Supreme Court, however, construed the 
original Rule 24 narrowly, noting that a person whose interests were not 
adequately represented by existing parties to a litigation could never be bound 
by the litigation, making it logically impossible for a proposed intervenor to 
establish both that it was not adequately represented and that it would be bound 
by an adverse judgment. 101 Although subsequent amendments to Rule 24 
liberalized intervention doctrine, 102 they did not change the Supreme Court's 
insistence that a non-party not adequately represented in a proceeding cannot 
98 Chase Nat '! Bank, 291 U.S. at 441. 
99 Intervention had its origins in equity and admiralty practice, and did not become 
generally available in civil actions until promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental 
Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 239-53 (2000). 
ioo FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (1940) (amended 1946). 
101 Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961). Sam Fox Publishing 
involved an attempt by small music publishers to intervene as of right in a proceeding by the 
federal government to modify an antitrust consent decree in a dispute with the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). Id. at 687. The Supreme Court 
held that because the publishers would not be bound by the consent judgment, they had no 
right to intervene: "We regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests 
coincide with the public interest in government antitrust litigation is nonetheless not bound 
by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right, intervene in it." Id. at 
689. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, went on to address the logical problem: 
[A]ppellants, however, face this dilemma: the judgment in a class action will bind only 
those members of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by 
existing parties to the litigation; yet intervention as of right presupposes that an 
intervenor's interests are or may not be so represented. Thus appellants' argument as 
to a divergence of interests between themselves and ASCAP proves too much, for to 
the extent that it is valid appellants should not be considered as members of the same 
class as the present defendants, and therefore are not "bound." On the other hand, if 
appellants are bound by ASCAP' s representation of the class, it can only be because 
that representation has been adequate, precluding any right to intervene. It would 
indeed be strange procedure to declare, on one hand, that ASCAP adequately 
represents the interests of the appellants and hence that this is properly a class suit, and 
then, on the other hand, to require intervention in order to insure of this representation 
in fact. 
Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted) . 
102 See Appel, supra note 99, at 254-58. 
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be bound by the results of that proceeding - even if the party would have been 
entitled to intervene in the proceeding. 103 
Rule 24 does not bind state courts like the court in Cuson. But, in Richards 
v. Jefferson County, the Supreme Court cited the Due Process Clause, not the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the basis for holding that a non-party to a 
proceeding cannot be bound by the result of that proceeding. 104 The Due 
Process Clause, of course, does bind state courts. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Constitution almost certainly does not prevent the 
state courts from barring neighbors from challenging a settlement if they 
choose not to intervene in ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court has said that 
in cases involving a public action that has only an indirect impact on an 
individual's interests, "we may assume that the States have wide latitude to 
establish procedures not only to limit the number of judicial proceedings that 
may be entertained but also to determine whether to accord a taxpayer any 
standing at all."105 That latitude would appear to include a mandatory 
intervention rule of the sort adopted by the court in Cuson. 106 
Perhaps the bigger issue with the Cuson approach is not conceptual, but 
practical. In reducing the obstacles to settlement, the Cuson court 
simultaneously undermined the doctrinal framework that required 
municipalities to comply with statutory procedures before making zoning 
changes. Parts II and III of this Article evaluate that tradeoff and potential 
alternatives. 
D. Impact on Settlement 
This discussion of doctrinal structure raises an obvious and important 
question: how much impact has doctrinal structure had on settlement rates in 
land use litigation? Unfortunately, the question admits of no easy answer. It is 
easy to identify large numbers of low-value land use cases that make their way 
to appellate courts. But state courts do not maintain reliable data from which 
one could compare settlement rates in land use cases with settlement rates in 
other litigation. First, most state systems do not maintain data on settlement 
103 Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 800 n.5 (1996) ( citing Chase Nat'/ Bank, 
291 U.S. at 441, with apparent approval); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) ("[A] 
party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he 
must be joined."). 
104 Richards, 517 U.S. at 805 ("Because petitioners received neither notice of, nor 
sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of 
federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an 
allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property."). 
105 Id. at 803. 
106 See Cuson v. Tallmadge Charter Twp., No. 234157, 2003 WL 21108470, at *4 (Mich. 
Ct. App. May 15, 2003). 
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rates. 107 Second, the data they do collect does not code zoning or land use 
cases as a separate category. 108 
Moreover, even if empirical work established that settlement rates are lower 
in zoning and land use cases than in other categories of cases, doctrinal 
structure might not explain the difference. For instance, agency costs might be 
particularly high in zoning and land use cases. 109 Because land use disputes 
are often hot-button political issues, local officials may prefer to blame courts 
for unfavorable outcomes, even if their lawyers advise them ahead of time that 
the prospect of municipal success is small. This agency cost problem may lead 
officials to litigate cases to judgment even when settlement may ultimately be 
in the interest of local residents. 
Even in the absence of empirical data, however, both intuition and economic 
analysis suggest that if a doctrinal model increases the cost of settlement to the 
settling parties, the parties will be less likely to settle than if settlement 
involved lower costs. 
II. INTEGRATING SETTLEMENT INTO PREVAILING MODELS OF LAND USE 
LAW 
Do doctrinal obstacles to settlement of land use litigation advance 
significant policy objectives? The social benefits associated with litigation of 
disputes (and conversely, with settlement of disputes) do not correlate perfectly 
with the private benefits. 110 Even private litigation has the potential to 
generate external benefits - development of precedent, 111 reinforcement of 
norms, 112 and, in some cases, optimal deterrence. 113 The correlation of private 
107 See Theodore Eisenberg, Use It or Pretenders Will Abuse It: The Importance of 
Archival Legal Information, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1, 12 (2006). 
108 The State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting, developed by the National Center for 
State Courts' Court Statistics Project, divides civil cases into a number of subcategories for 
reporting purposes. Zoning and land use cases would appear to fall into the more general 
subcategory of"Administrative Agency." COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT GUIDE 
TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 11 (2009), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_researc 
h/csp/CSPStatisticsGuidev 1.3 .pdf. 
109 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 404-10 (1977) (discussing options facing municipal officials 
concerned about re-election possibilities); Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and 
Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1736-42 (1988) (discussing the difficulty municipal 
officials face in aggregating preferences). 
110 Shaven, supra note 10, at 577. 
111 John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1129, 1134 (2009); Lederman, supra note 10, at 258-59; Shaven, supra note IO, at 
595-96 (discussing "amplification of law," which occurs "through its interpretation and the 
setting of precedents"). 
112 Fiss, supra note 10, at I 085. 
113 Shavell, supra note 10, at 578. Of course, as Shaven notes, there may also be cases in 
which private litigation generates more litigation than would be socially optimal. Id. 
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and social benefits becomes even more complex with public law litigation. 114 
When government officials are on one side of a litigation, one might ideally 
expect those public officials to account for all of the social costs and benefits 
of litigating rather than settling. But, of course, most separation of powers 
principles operate on the assumption that no single official, and no single 
branch of government, will adequately account for social costs and benefits. 
Almost nowhere is that more true than in the process of land use regulation. 
Although local governments play the primary role both in enacting land use 
regulations and in enforcing them, state law constrains the regulatory power of 
local officials. State statutes typically impose on localities a format for local 
regulation, often mandating a particular planning process, 115 requiring public 
hearings, 116 and limiting the availability of administrative relief. 117 
Land use scholars have developed a number of models to rationalize this 
pattern of checks and balances on local decision makers. None of these 
models has focused explicitly on the power of municipal officials to settle land 
use litigation. But each model provides a context for evaluating the wisdom of 
doctrinal restraints on settlement of litigation. This Section examines the role 
settlement might play in each of three models of land use regulation. 
A. The "Plan" Model 
Although it has fallen from academic favor during the last quarter 
century, 118 the "plan" model of land use control was prevalent from zoning's 
114 Owen Piss observed that within any organization, the formal procedures for 
identifying who can make decisions on behalf of the organization are imperfect in assessing 
the interests of the persons bound by those decisions. Piss, supra note 10, at 1078. But Piss 
emphasized that when governmental entities are involved, the procedures for generating 
authoritative consent to a settlement are "far cruder." Id. at 1079. Moreover, in the case of 
groups who bring much public law litigation, the procedures are often non-existent. Id. at 
1079-81. 
115 See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW§ 272-a (McKinney 2004). 
116 See, e.g., id. § 272-a(6). 
117 See, e.g., id. § 267-b (imposing the framework the board of appeals must use in 
evaluating applications for use variances and area variances); Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals of 
Saddle Rock, 795 N.E.2d 619, 621 , 624 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that state standards preempt 
inconsistent local regulations, and overturning the grant of administrative relief as 
inconsistent with statutory requirements). 
118 Carol Rose 's 1983 assault on what she called "plan jurisprudence" marked a 
significant departure from prior academic work, which had criticized the practice of 
piecemeal zoning changes. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land 
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 841-46 (1983). For 
earlier work focusing on the evil of piecemeal changes, see, for example, Jesse Dukeminier, 
Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. 
L.J. 273, 330-35, 349-50 (1962). For the classic article seeking to breathe life into the 
requirement in the SZEA that zoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, see 
Charles M. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan ", 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154 
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inception through much of the Twentieth Century. As a result, the model 
shaped and continues to shape much land use doctrine. 
The model's central premise is that planning is a rational process that 
improves on land use patterns generated by piecemeal decisions, whether those 
decisions be made by market participants or by government decision 
makers. 119 A subsidiary premise is that municipal decision makers can be 
trusted to enact ordinances that reflect the insights of the planning process.120 
Within the plan model, rational planning requires objective analysis of data 
- particularly about population and economic trends - which enables 
professionals to lay out a municipality in ways that enable it to keep pace with 
future development needs. 121 Building on that analysis, a commission 
insulated from politics would draft a zoning ordinance for ultimate enactment 
by the local legislative body. 122 
The rational planning model requires doctrinal precautions against 
subsequent changes that might exalt politics or self-interest over the scientific 
analysis embodied in the original ordinance. Doctrine has developed such 
precautions. First, although enabling statutes and zoning ordinances provide 
for administrative variances, they narrowly circumscribe the power to grant 
those variances. 123 
Second, although the local legislative body typically has broader power to 
enact zoning amendments, that power, too, is subject to doctrinal limits. 
Enabling acts typically impose public hearing requirements, in part to ensure 
that local officials who seek to change an ordinance must face political heat for 
(1955). 
119 See Haar, supra note 118, at 1155; Rose, supra note 118, at 848-49. The drafters of 
the SZEA included the requirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan" out of fear that municipalities would otherwise engage in "haphazard or piecemeal 
zoning." STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 & n.22 (Advisory Comm. on 
Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210 
app. A, at 214-15 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968). 
120 But see Rose, supra note 118, at 854-56 (challenging the underlying trust granted to 
decision makers in the context oflocal government). Trust on this score did not always run 
deep. Often, the task of proposing the initial ordinance was left to a commission, whose 
work was designed to be free from the influence of politics, on the theory that the final 
product would be better if the local legislature had to adopt the work as a whole rather than 
tinkering with small pieces of the ordinance. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 266 (requiring 
appointment of commission to recommend district boundaries prior to enactment of first 
zoning ordinance). 
121 See Ira Michael Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 
13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183, 228-29 (1972). 
122 See Anthony James Catanese, Learning by Comparison: Lessons from Experiences, 
in PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND PLANNING: How CITY PLANNERS WORK 179, 183-87 
(Anthony James Catanese & W. Paul Farmer eds., 1978) (discussing the politicization of the 
planning process and the changing role of independent commissions). 
123 See, e.g., N.Y. ToWNLAW § 267-b. 
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doing so. 124 In addition, state courts have developed prohibitions on "spot 
zoning," sometimes in reliance on statutory requirements that zoning be "in 
accord with the comprehensive plan."125 Some jurisdictions have taken the 
plan model one step further, treating zoning amendments as "quasi-judicial" 
actions subject to searching judicial review, 126 or prohibiting all amendments 
unless the amending body can demonstrate a change in conditions or a mistake 
in the original ordinance. 127 
The rational planning model, then, reflects a fear that developers ( and to a 
lesser extent neighbors) will capture the zoning process, forfeiting the insights 
of the rational planning process. The assumption, then, is that local elected 
officials cannot be trusted to act in the interest of the broader body politic. 
Courts, by contrast, serve an important policing function, because most of the 
doctrinal restrictions on zoning changes are judicially enforceable. 
B. The Public Choice Model 
The rational planning model has fallen out of academic favor in recent 
decades, in part because even planners have lost faith in their ability to devise 
long-term end-state plans, 128 and in part out of recognition that planning and 
politics cannot realistically be separated. 129 But the plan model's fall from 
scholarly grace has not resulted in repeal of the restrictions on municipal 
zoning activity. Perhaps the restrictions persist because the insights of legal 
and planning scholarship do not immediately filter down to state zoning and 
planning legislation. Another explanation reflects the influence of public 
choice theory on land use regulation. 130 
Public choice theory is primarily concerned with the agency costs that lead 
government officials to make decisions in their own interests, which may 
diverge from those of their constituents. 131 In particular, public choice 
124 See, e.g., id. § 264(4). 
125 See, e.g., Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Shelton, 947 A.2d 361, 368-70, 
369 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
126 See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (Wash. 1971) (en 
bane). 
127 See, e.g., Clayman v. Prince George's County, 292 A.2d 689, 695 (Md. 1972). 
128 See, e.g., MELVILLE C. BRANCH, CONTINUOUS CITY PLANNING 47-49 (1981). 
129 See Catanese, supra note 122, at 183-87. 
13° For a public choice analysis of the need for judicial constraints on local government 
activity, see Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon 's Rule, or, Can Public Choice 
Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991). 
131 James Buchanan, one of the pioneers of public choice theory, commented that in a 
"representative democracy, we must introduce the possible divergence between the interests 
of the representative or agent who is elected or appointed to act for the group and the 
interests of the group members themselves." James M. Buchanan, Politics Without 
Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in 
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE - II, at 11, 18 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison 
eds., rev. ed. 1984). Buchanan went on to observe that, among public choice scholars: 
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theorists fear that government officials respond to "rent-seeking" behavior, 
resulting in inefficient regulation, combined with inefficient expenditure of 
resources obtaining that regulation.132 At the local level, mobility of residents 
imposes constraints on the potential for rent-seeking. More than fifty years 
ago, Charles Tiebout demonstrated that, assuming enough competing 
municipalities and perfect mobility of residents, competition among 
municipalities could ensure efficient provision of municipal services. 133 
Tiebout's assumptions, however, are heroic with respect to many 
municipalities. 134 As a result, even if competition exerts some constraint on 
inefficient regulation, rent-seeking remains prevalent within the land use 
process. 135 
Rent-seeking is not limited to any particular interest group. Developers 
have much at stake in the land use process, and they are often willing to fund 
politically-valuable amenities or projects in return for regulatory concessions. 
Moreover, because many of the benefits developers seek are personal to them, 
they do not face significant organizational problems in lobbying for those 
Electoral competition has come more and more to be viewed as competition among 
prospective monopolists, all of whom are bidding for an exclusive franchise, with 
profit maximizing assumed to characterize the behavior of the successful bidder. 
Governments are viewed as exploiters of the citizenry, rather than the means through 
which the citizenry secures for itself goods and services that can best be provided 
jointly or collectively. 
Id. at 19. 
132 Buchanan defined rent-seeking as "behavior in institutional settings where individual 
efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus." James M. 
Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING 
SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). 
133 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures , 64 J. POL. ECON. 4 I 6, 419-
20 (1956). 
134 See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 
93 , 93 (1981) ("The pure [Tiebout] model ... involves a set of assumptions so patently 
unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous."). For instance, scholars have questioned whether 
residents may move without cost from one jurisdiction to another to take advantage of a 
more attractive package of costs and governmental services, one of the foundations of the 
Tiebout model. See, e.g., David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional 
Boundaries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73, 92-93 (1989) 
(concluding that few citizens contemplate moving in response to governmental services). 
Others have questioned whether municipalities act as profit-maximizers. See, e.g., Truman 
F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout 's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 
713,719 (1981). 
135 See Gillette, supra note 130, at 971-75 (arguing that neither exit nor voice will 
adequately discipline local officials); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities 
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 V AND. L. REv. 831 , 867 (1992) (concluding that 
competition alone will not prevent municipalities from imposing exactions that exceed 
external costs generated by new development). 
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benefits. 136 Homeowners, however, are also participants in the rent-seeking 
process. Although their large numbers make it harder for them to organize, 
their numbers give them voting power that often enables them to dominate 
local politics. 137 
The goal of rent-seeking behavior, whether by developers or neighbors, is 
procuring a municipal decision that authorizes (or prohibits) a particular 
development, or a development of a specified type. If the decision is subject to 
searching judicial review, the decision will be less valuable to the parties who 
lobby for it. Judicial review, then, reduces the return on an investment in rent-
seeking, and consequently reduces the incentive to engage in rent-seeking. 
C. The Mediation Model 
A mediation model of land use regulation, developed most extensively by 
Carol Rose, shares with both the plan model and the public choice model a 
recognition that in the absence of legal constraints, local officials are subject to 
factional influence of special economic interests. 138 Unlike proponents of the 
plan or public choice models, however, Rose embraced the role of politics in 
the land use process, suggesting that local officials effectively act as mediators 
in local land use disputes. 139 
The mediation model rejects the rational planning ideal as unrealistic, in 
large measure because government bodies will not focus on abstract planning 
issues. Instead, specific development proposals that generate concrete disputes 
energize local officials. 140 In the mediation model, piecemeal changes -
anathema to rational planners - are at the heart of land use regulation. 
Planning is a rolling process that simply requires decision makers to take 
careful account of a number of values in making individualized decisions. 141 
Within the mediation model, participants in land use disputes derive 
protection from "voice" and "exit," not from placing local officials in 
136 See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. 
L. REV. 1243, 1272-73 (1997). Developer influence may have a greater impact in larger 
municipalities, where the issues faced by the local government are more diffuse and where 
majority interests are more likely to be sacrificed in a logrolling process. See Robert C. 
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J . 385, 
406-08 (1977). 
137 Robert Ellickson has suggested that homeowner interests dominate many suburban 
communities. See Ellickson, supra note 136, at 405-07. That proposition also serves as the 
foundation for William A. Fischel's "homevoter hypothesis," which assumes that 
homeowners "are the most numerous and politically influential group within most 
localities." WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4-6 (2001); see also Dana, 
supra note 136, at 1273. 
138 Rose, supra note 118, at 863 . 
139 Id. at 887-93. 
140 Id. at 874-75. 
141 Id. at 875-76. 
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legislative or judicial handcuffs. 142 Mediation guarantees each party input into 
the decision making process, and allows each party to raise concerns beyond 
those that might be reflected in any formal plan document. Moreover, 
mediation encourages compromise; sometimes the interests of the parties can 
be accommodated in a way that a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance 
cannot anticipate. 143 Mediation does raise the possibility of redistribution 
among the parties in the process, but no one forces parties to participate in the 
land use process; exit is an option for those unwilling to take regulatory risks. 
Much land use doctrine developed over the past three decades is consistent 
with the mediation model. Judicial condemnation of contract zoning has 
moderated, and courts have developed doctrines that enforce bargains between 
developers and municipalities. 144 Floating zones145 and planned unit 
developments 146 provide municipalities with the flexibility to negotiate deals 
with developers over individual projects, taking into account the strength and 
breadth of community sentiment about project alternatives. Judicial deference 
142 Albert Hirschman developed the terms "voice" and "exit" to describe two forces that 
serve to discipline institutional actors, including businesses, political parties, and volunteer 
organizations. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 120-23 (1970). "Voice" 
refers to the effort of a customer, member, or constituent to change existing practices, while 
"exit" refers to the customer, member, or constituent' s decision to depart from the 
enterprise. Id. at 4. 
143 Mark Fenster has made this point in the course of criticizing the Supreme Court's 
exactions doctrine: 
Negotiation by property owners and local governments over the exchange of 
entitlements is more likely to reach a mutually agreeable solution when parties can 
consider a wide universe of terms as part of a bargain than when the negotiation is 
limited in scope by formal rules imposed and enforced by external judicial agents. 
Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 675 (2004). 
144 Indeed, many states have, by statute, authorized development agreements that permit 
municipalities to contract to freeze regulations in order to induce development. See Green, 
supra note 53, at 394-95, 400; Wegner, supra note 53, at 997-1000. 
145 When a municipality' s zoning ordinance creates a floating zone, it specifies all of the 
uses and standards applicable within the zone, but does not locate the zone on the zoning 
map. Instead, a developer who wants to build in accordance with the zone's standards 
applies to have the floating zone applied to his property. The New York Court of Appeals 
approved the technique in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 735-36 (N.Y. 
1951), and other courts have followed suit. See, e.g. , Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 
S.W.2d 734, 738-39 (Ky. 1973); Bigenho v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 237 A.2d 53, 56-
58 (Md. 1968). 
146 When a municipality zones land into a planned unit development district, it 
essentially invites the developer to propose a project that the municipality will consider as a 
whole, rather than requiring the developer to adhere to pre-set standards. For an early case 
upholding a PUD ordinance, see Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. , 241 A.2d 81 , 84-
85, 87 (Pa. 1968). 
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to local board decisions - both on variance applications and on zoning 
amendments - is also consistent with the mediation model. 
The model reflected by these established doctrines, and rationalized by Rose 
and others, casts municipal officials in the role of mediators. Even more 
recently, a number of state legislatures have explicitly incorporated an 
opportunity for more formal mediation into the land use process after 
municipal officials have made their initial determination on a landowner's 
application. Florida was a pioneer in providing for mediation of land use 
disputes, 147 but a number of other states have followed suit. 148 In Florida, once 
a local government makes a decision on a development order, an unhappy 
developer can seek a mediated solution rather than proceeding directly to 
litigation. 149 Although the Florida statute has been on the books for fifteen 
years, developers have not made widespread use of mediation, 150 in part 
because of two unresolved questions about the statutory scheme: who, besides 
the developer and the municipality, will be a party to the mediation, 151 and 
what rights will non-parties have to challenge any mediated solution? 152 
147 The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act was enacted in 
1995. FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (2010). For a general review of the act ' s operation, see Mark S. 
Bentley, Understanding the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act, 
37 STETSON L. REV. 381 (2008). 
148 See, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 8-8a (2010); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 5, § 3341 (2009). 
149 See FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (3). 
15° Cf Bentley, supra note 147, at 390 ("[A]s of October 4, 2007, only eight out of 
[Florida's] sixty-seven counties and three out of four hundred and twelve cities have 
adopted procedures to implement the Act."). 
151 The statute allows abutting owners and persons who submitted testimony in support 
of the municipality's order to request participation in the proceeding. FLA. STAT. § 
70.51(12). The statute then states that "[t]hose persons may be permitted to participate in 
the hearing but shall not be granted party or intervenor status." Id. 
152 The statute provides that: 
The first responsibility of the special magistrate is to facilitate a resolution of the 
conflict between the owner and governmental entities to the end that some modification 
of the owner's proposed use of the property or adjustment in the development order or 
enforcement action or regulatory efforts by one or more of the governmental parties 
may be reached. Accordingly, the special magistrate shall act as a facilitator or 
mediator between the parties in an effort to effect a mutually acceptable solution. The 
parties shall be represented at the mediation by persons with authority to bind their 
respective parties to a solution, or by persons with authority to recommend a solution 
directly to the persons with authority to bind their respective parties to a solution. 
Id. § 70.5 l(l 7)(a). The statute does not indicate what rights any non-party has in those 
cases where the parties reach a mutually acceptable solution. Where the parties do not reach 
such a solution, the statute permits the special magistrate to make recommendations, which 
the magistrate then submits to the governmental entity for consideration. Id.§ 70.51(21). If 
the developer is unhappy with the governmental entity's action, the developer may then 
bring an action. Id. § 70.51(24). The statute does not discuss the right of a non-party to 
challenge the governmental entity's action. 
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Within the mediation model, voice and exit - not robust judicial oversight -
shape and discipline municipal decisions. Land use decisions acquire 
legitimacy if all affected parties had the opportunity to participate in the 
process. Participation is the mechanism for transforming land use regulation 
from a zero-sum game to one where the interests of multiple parties can be 
accommodated. Judicial review retains a role within the mediation model, but 
the focus of judicial review is on ensuring that all parties have had an 
opportunity to participate in the decision making process, not on evaluating the 
merits of the municipality's decision. 
D. The Role of Settlement Restrictions Within the Models 
Although litigation plays a role within each of the models of land use 
regulation, the roles vary considerably among the models. Within the plan and 
public choice models, litigation operates primarily to protect against regulatory 
capture. By contrast, voice and exit - not litigation - provide the principal 
safeguard against capture within the mediation model. If municipal officials 
are to act as effective mediators, however, participation by all interested parties 
is critical - both because participation itself may be a value, 153 and because 
participation generates information that permits officials to make more 
informed decisions. 154 Within the mediation model, litigation operates to 
ensure adequate participation in the decision making process. 155 
153 In the words of Roderick Hills, local government theorists have sometimes argued 
that "participation in local politics is not only a good way to control government, but also a 
useful way to transform citizens, imbuing them with civic spirit, a taste for public affairs, 
and political skills." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a 
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2000) (reviewing 
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
(1999)). Gerald Frug in particular has championed the city as an entity that fosters political 
participation, which he views as freedom enhancing. Jerry Frug, Decentering 
Decentralization, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993) (discussing ' 'the freedom gained from 
the ability to participate in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life"); Gerald E. 
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-73 (1980); see also 
Richard Briffault, Our Loca/ism: Part II - Loca/ism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346, 396 (1990); Fenster, supra note 143, at 671-72. 
For other discussions of the advantages of participation, see Carol M. Rose, New Models 
for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1985) (stating that the goal 
within the mediation process is to assure, through participation, the "parties' future ability to 
get along"); Rose, supra note 118, at 898 (stressing that "'venting"' alone may "help[] the 
disputants to accept a decision"). 
154 See Rose, supra note 118, at 898 (remarking that "voice" keeps decision makers 
"informed of costs and benefits"). 
155 Id. at 900 ("[C]ourt[s] should focus on voice in mediation and ask whether the local 
body went through the steps of identifying disputants, exploring issues, and explaining 
results."). 
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Amelioration of doctrinal restrictions on settlement would reduce the 
number of land use disputes that proceed to final judgment. This Section 
demonstrates, however, that those doctrinal restrictions, in their current form, 
are not necessary to preserve the role of litigation as a tool for disciplining 
municipal behavior. 
1. Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Developer Capture 
Public choice theory suggests that developers may exert disproportionate 
influence in the land use process because their interests are highly 
concentrated, 156 eliminating the organization problems that face neighbors who 
might oppose development. Statutory and judicially-imposed constraints on 
the decisions municipal officials make, which neighbors enforce through 
litigation, reduce the value of any concessions a developer receives from 
municipal officials, and therefore reduce the amount the developer will be 
willing to pay to influence those officials. The threat of litigation has a similar 
salutary effect within the plan model: developers will be willing to spend less 
to obtain deviations from the plan if neighbors can litigate to undo those 
deviations. 
Within these models, the litigation that disciplines municipal officials is 
litigation that neighbors bring. But once the neighbors commence litigation 
challenging municipal action, there is little reason for legal doctrine to 
constrain the power of the interested parties (neighbors, municipality, and 
developer) to settle the dispute. Any potential settlement will reflect the 
parties' expectation of success in the litigation, 157 and the prospect of 
settlement should create the same incentives for the developer as the prospect 
of litigation. So long as the doctrinal rules that would be applied in litigation 
are adequately protective of neighbor interests, there is every reason to believe 
that settlement - which reflects the expected result of litigation - should 
generate the same deterrent effect as litigation to judgment. 
Similarly, within the plan model, if the threat of litigation operates to 
preserve the sanctity of the plan, it does so only to the extent neighbors are 
willing to challenge municipal decisions favoring developers.158 Because the 
willingness of neighbors to settle will generally reflect their prospects in 
litigation, settlement is not likely to weaken neighbor litigation as a mechanism 
for safeguarding the plan. 
156 See Dana, supra note 136, at 1272; Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just 
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as 
Public Use?, 34 E COLOGY L.Q. 443, 466 (2007). 
157 See Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4-17 . 
158 The neighbors may not care about preserving the plan, but only about the private 
benefits they derive from preventing a proposed development. As a result, the situations in 
which they choose to litigate may not coincide with the cases in which proponents of plan 
jurisprudence might believe litigation would be socially optimal. See Shavell, supra note 
10, at 575-79. 
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This analysis suggests that, from a regulatory capture perspective, there is 
little advantage to superimposing public hearing requirements or additional 
environmental review on settlements approved by the litigating parties - the 
neighbors, the municipality, and the developer. Imposing such requirements 
would make litigation relatively more attractive than settlement, but would not 
provide any additional safeguards against regulatory capture. 
Of course, many of the costs of restrictions on settlement will be generated 
not in litigation commenced by neighbors, but in litigation brought by 
developers. Restricting settlement of those cases, however, will have little 
effect on regulatory capture. By hypothesis, the developer has already lost 
before the municipal officials, suggesting that the municipal officials were not 
terribly susceptible to capture in the first instance. One might imagine cases in 
which municipal officials hope to have it both ways - by making public 
decisions popular with neighbors with the expectation that the developer will 
then sue, leading the municipality to capitulate. In that way, municipal 
officials might seek "cover" from the ultimate capitulation. 159 But in those 
cases, municipal officials are unlikely to settle any litigation brought by the 
developer, even if there are no doctrinal restrictions on settlement. The 
"cover" will be much more effective if a court orders the municipality to 
rescind the restrictions than if the municipality accomplishes the same result 
through settlement. 
Perhaps concerns about regulatory capture are most significant during 
regime transitions. 160 Municipal officials might enact a zoning restriction or 
deny a permit or variance during one administration. During the course of 
litigation by the developer, that regime might be replaced by a new 
administration more sympathetic to development. In that circumstance, one 
might reasonably be concerned that the new administration would be too quick 
to settle on terms unfavorable to neighbors. In that situation, however, the new 
administration could evade any restrictions on settlement of litigation by using 
its new power to rescind the offending restrictions. Even in this circumstance, 
then, concerns about regulatory capture provide no justification for doctrinal 
restrictions on settlement. 
2. Settlement Restrictions as a Protection Against Uninformed Decisions 
Unless municipal officials have adequate information about the impact 
zoning changes or development approvals would have on neighboring 
landowners, those officials are unlikely to function effectively as mediators 
between developers and neighbors. Many of the doctrinal requirements that 
159 See Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLU/PA and the Mediation 
of Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435,460. 
16° For discussion of the problems associated with settlement during presidential 
transitions, see Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The 
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1033-43 (2001). 
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surround zoning decisions - from public hearing requirements 161 to 
environmental review procedures162 - are designed in part to ensure that 
decision makers are fully informed. 
From an information perspective, permitting municipal officials to settle 
litigation with developers presents a potential problem: a settlement on terms 
different from those originally considered at a public hearing may not be vetted 
as fully as was the original proposal municipal officials rejected. On that basis, 
one might contend that doctrinal restrictions on settlement - including the 
requirement of additional public hearings and environmental review - remain 
important safeguards in the municipal decision making process. 
Two factors undermine this argument. First, the initial public hearing on a 
controversial zoning issue is likely to educate municipal officials not just about 
neighborhood objections to the developer's particular proposal, but also about 
more general neighbor perspectives on appropriate development of the area. In 
a state that requires environmental review of the initial proposal, that review 
most likely included review of the environmental impact of alternative 
development proposals. 163 All of that information remains available to 
municipal officials considering subsequent settlement offers, reducing the 
likelihood that settlement decisions will be based on too little information. 
Second, compare the information available to municipal officials evaluating 
settlement proposals with the information base on which a decision will be 
made if there is no settlement. In that instance, if a court overturns the 
municipality's decision, it has two alternatives. Most frequently, the court will 
remand to the local board for reconsideration of the developer's application. 164 
At that point, there will be additional opportunity for interested parties to 
generate information about any proposed development. In other 
circumstances, courts approve the developer's project, without soliciting any 
public comment or conducting further environmental review. 165 When that 
161 See Rose, supra note 118, at 897; Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct 
Democracy in Making Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 293, 296 
(2001/2002). 
162 See, e.g., Citizens Alliance to Protect Our Wetlands v. City of Auburn, 894 P.2d 
1300, 1304 (Wash. 1995) (en bane) (indicating that the impact statement requirement is 
designed to make sure decision makers have "sufficient information to make a reasoned 
decision"); Sterk, supra note 73, at 2052-53; see also Keith H. Hirokawa, The Prima Facie 
Burden and the Vanishing SEPA Threshold: Washington's Emerging Preference for 
Efficiency over Accuracy, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 403, 403, 428-29 (2002) (examining the 
exchange of environmental information under a Washington state statute); Rose, supra note 
153, at 1169 (explaining that environmental impact review shares some characteristics with 
mediation, such as collecting information). 
163 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§ 8-0109(2)(d), (2)(j) (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
164 See, e.g., In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008). 
165 See, e.g., Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Appeal, 909 
N .E.2d 1161, 1172-73 (Mass. 2009) ( ordering grant of special permit and variance because 
remand "would delay an inevitable result"). 
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happens, the final decision on the developer's project will be based on no more 
information than would be available at the time of any settlement of the 
developer's claim. As a result, it is not clear to what extent restricting 
settlement will ensure a fuller information base for zoning decisions. 
3. Settlement Restrictions as a Mechanism for Assuring Participation 
"Voice" plays multiple roles within the mediation model of land use 
regulation. Not only does voice act to insure informed decision making, it also 
lends legitimacy to the ultimate decision made by municipal officials. 166 When 
constituents have an opportunity to participate in local political decisions, the 
chances increase that they will accept even determinations adverse to their 
interests. 167 
On the participation score, easy settlement of litigation between a developer 
and the municipality presents a problem. Neighbors, who have prevailed 
before the local board of trustees or zoning board of appeals, now discover that 
their victory may have been pyrrhic - because the developer has, through 
negotiation conducted without broad neighborhood participation, obtained 
relief denied to it through the ordinary, open, political channels. 
Of course, when a dispute between a developer and the municipality is 
resolved through litigation, there will generally be no opportunity for neighbor 
participation. But at least if the litigation continues through to judgment, 
municipal officials will have advanced, in a public forum, the position the 
municipality endorsed through the political processes. Moreover, the judicial 
system itself is imbued with a sense of legitimacy in resolving disputes, 
reducing any sense of unfairness to non-participating neighbors. 168 Closed-
door settlements, by contrast, have neither of these features. As a result, easy 
settlement, without neighbor participation, or even an opportunity for 
neighbors to be heard, creates legitimacy problems within the mediation 
model. 
4. Settlement Restrictions as a Constraint on Neighbor Capture 
Another possible justification for restrictions on settlement focuses on 
protecting against inefficiencies generated by neighbor capture of the 
regulatory process. Suppose municipal officials know that all actions that 
disgruntled developers bring will be litigated to final judgment. Those 
officials now have an incentive to act reasonably in imposing restrictions on a 
developer, because unreasonable restrictions generate a high risk of loss in 
166 See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local 
land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REv. 464, 486 (2000) (observing that participatory 
opportunities in resolving land use disputes afford those opposing the decision "the ability 
to help frame the ... debate"); Rose, supra note 153, at 1168. 
167 See Fenster, supra note 143, at 670. 
168 One of the reasons judges and courts enjoy a sense of legitimacy stems from the 
requirement that they explain their decisions. Cf Rose, supra note 118, at 899-900. 
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litigation, which leaves the municipality in a weaker position than if it had 
acted reasonably. 
By contrast, one might surmise that if those same officials knew that 
settlement of a litigation were a possibility, they might push the envelope a bit 
further, enacting unreasonable regulations with the understanding that if the 
developer were to bring suit, the municipality could then offer to settle on 
terms more reasonable to the developer. That is, the possibility of subsequent 
settlement might lead municipal officials to act less reasonably ex ante. 169 
Although some municipal officials might behave that way, the strategy will 
typically be a losing one if developers act rationally. The strategy depends on 
the assumption that the municipality will be able to retreat from unreasonable 
restrictions once a developer starts litigation. But that assumption depends on 
the developer's willingness to negotiate. The more unreasonable the 
municipality's original determination, the more likely the developer will 
prevail in the litigation, and the less willing the developer will be to settle on 
terms that are attractive to the municipality.l7° As a result, the prospect of 
169 Justice Scalia raised a similar fear in his opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), where he wrote that he might expect that a regime in 
which a pennit condition did not have to serve the same governmental purpose as a 
pennissible development ban "would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State 
then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals 
purportedly sought to be served." Id. at 837 & n.5. 
170 The process can be modeled as a two-player game in which the municipality moves 
first by deciding whether to act reasonably or unreasonably in evaluating a developer's 
application. The developer then decides whether to litigate or to settle. Assume that if the 
municipality enacts an unreasonable regulation, and the regulation remains in force, the 
developer does not develop, leaving the municipality with no costs or benefits. Assume also 
that if the neighbor-dominated municipality imposes "reasonable" restrictions on the 
developer, the resulting aggregate hann to the neighbors will be $400,000. If, however, the 
developer can develop free of restrictions, the harm to the neighbors will be $1,000,000. In 
this stylized example, assume the harm the development generates for the neighbors is 
precisely equal to the benefit to the developer. 
If the municipality enacts the reasonable regulation, the developer faces an uphill battle in 
any litigation. Assume, for instance, that the developer has only a I 0% chance of 
prevailing. The value of any litigation to the developer is $60,000 (the developer has a I 0% 
probability of reaping an additional $600,000 in benefit). In that circumstance, the cost and 
delays attendant to litigation will generally make it worth the developer's while to accept the 
municipality's regulation. Because the municipality knows that, there is little reason for the 
municipality to offer any more in settlement. The result is a regulation that generates 
$400,000 in benefit to the developer, and an equal cost to the neighbors. 
Suppose instead that the municipality enacts an unreasonable regulation, and assume now 
that the developer has a 60% chance of prevailing in litigation (allowing for the 
extraordinary deference courts typically afford to municipal land use decisions). The 
expected value of the litigation to the developer is $600,000 (60% of$ I ,000,000). In the 
absence of doctrinal restrictions on settlement, the municipality could make a settlement 
offer to avoid potential loss in the litigation (and the attendant litigation costs). But the 
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settlement should not induce the municipality to act unreasonably, and 
concerns about neighbor capture do not justify doctrinal constraints on 
settlement. 
5. Summary 
Within both the plan and the public choice models of land use regulation, 
litigation plays a significant role in guarding against regulatory capture. 
Permitting unconstrained settlement does not significantly undermine that role. 
If the primary concern is capture by developers, the municipality will, by 
hypothesis, have capitulated to developers, leading to litigation by neighbors. 
But even if there are no doctrinal constraints on settlement, neighbors will be 
unlikely to settle on terms less favorable than their expected result in litigation, 
providing adequate protection against collusion between the municipality and 
developers. 
Similarly, if the primary concern involves capture by neighbors, the 
developer is unlikely to settle on terms less favorable than those the developer 
believes it can obtain in litigation, so that doctrinal restraints on settlement are 
unnecessary to deter municipal officials from capitulating to those neighbors. 
The case for doctrinal constraints on settlement is somewhat stronger within 
the mediation model, where the threat of litigation operates to ensure informed 
and participatory decision making. In particular, permitting settlements to bind 
persons who had no opportunity to participate in the settlement process 
threatens the legitimacy of the regulatory process. The next Section considers 
alternative mechanisms for addressing that concern while mitigating the 
inefficiencies associated with current doctrine. 
III. POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT STRUCTURES 
As Part I demonstrated, the principal doctrinal obstacle to settlement of land 
use litigation is the potential for attack on the settlement by affected parties -
principally neighbors, but in some instances other governmental entities. 
Unless a doctrinal framework can preclude such attacks, settlement will remain 
unattractive to developers who challenge municipal land use decisions. This 
Part considers four alternative frameworks - one that eliminates doctrinal 
restrictions altogether, a second that seeks to ensure that municipal decision 
makers will better represent their constituents, a third that relies on judicial 
approval to represent non-parties to the litigation, and a fourth that relies on 
neighbors themselves to represent their interests. 
developer would have no reason to accept such an offer unless the municipality's offer 
approached the value of the litigation. So long as that is true, the municipality does not 
obtain any better payoff by enacting an unreasonable regulation than by enacting a 
reasonable regulation. Hence, the rational choice for the municipality is to enact the 
reasonable regulation. The ready availability of settlement does not induce the municipality 
to enact unreasonable restrictions. 
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A. Dispensing with All Doctrinal Restrictions 
Perhaps the simplest way to encourage settlement of land use disputes 
would be to permit municipal officials to approve settlement of litigation with 
a developer without requiring time-consuming subsequent approval by the 
relevant land use boards, with their attendant public hearings. Doctrine could 
accomplish virtually the same result by denying neighbors standing to 
challenge any settlement. The two solutions are virtually equivalent because 
standing would do the neighbors little good if doctrine removed any doctrinal 
basis on which the neighbors could frame a complaint. 
Giving municipal officials a free hand to settle land use litigation would 
resemble the judicial approach to settlement of another class of public law 
litigation: administrative agency enforcement proceedings. Just as municipal 
officials are charged with interpreting and enforcing local land use regulations, 
administrative agencies are charged with enforcement of a wide variety of 
statutes and regulations. When an agency brings an enforcement proceeding 
against a regulated entity in alleged violation of a statute or regulation, th.e 
parties might want to settle, but settlement would be of little value to the 
regulated entity if third parties were free to challenge the settlement. 
The D.C. Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Heckler v. 
Chaney, 171 has held that agency decisions to settle enforcement proceedings 
are unreviewable. 172 The court has applied the presumption to settlements that 
are forward-looking as well as backward-looking. 173 Thus, in addition to 
171 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Chaney, the Supreme Court held that an agency's decision 
not to bring an enforcement proceeding is presumptively unreviewable, relying on section 
70l(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 832, which creates an exception to the 
Act's judicial review provisions in cases where "agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (2006). In concluding that enforcement decisions 
are committed to agency discretion, the Court reasoned, analogizing to principles of 
prosecutorial discretion, that agencies are in the best position to assess whether enforcement 
resources are best spent on pursuing a particular alleged violation, and on whether the 
enforcement proceeding is likely to succeed. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32. 
Chaney itself involved a challenge by death row inmates to the FDA's failure to bring an 
enforcement action against states that planned to use drugs for lethal injections even though 
the FDA had not approved the drugs for that purpose. Id. at 823. Perhaps tongue-in-cheek, 
the challengers contended that the FDA was required to approve the drugs "as 'safe and 
effective' for human execution" and that the FDA should affix warnings to the drugs stating 
that "they were unapproved and unsafe for human execution." Id. at 824. 
172 Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bait. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 252 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
N.Y. State Dep' t of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Schering Corp. v. 
Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit also applied the 
presumption of nonreviewability in Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Products Safety 
Commission, 146 F. App'x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2005). 
173 Lisa Bressman has criticized application of the presumption to cases in which the 
agency abstains from enforcing statutes and rules against future conduct. She contends that 
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settlements in which the agency required a regulated entity to make payments 
for past violations, 174 the presumption applies to settlements by which the 
agency agreed to abstain from taking action for a specified period of time, 175 
and settlements which required the regulated party to take action in the 
future .176 The presumption applies without regard to the stage of the dispute 
during which the parties reach settlement. 177 
In the typical agency enforcement provision, then, the presumption of 
nonreviewability effectively confers on agencies broad power to settle with 
regulated entities. 178 As a result, the potential for third-party claims should not 
significantly interfere with the incentives of the agency and regulated entities 
to settle their disputes.179 
"[s]ince the societal interest in preventing future harms to statutory beneficiaries is 'more 
focused and in many circumstances more pressing' than the societal interest in punishing the 
past conduct of particular individuals, it often will justify increased judicial review and 
reduced administrative control." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency 
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1695 (2004) (quoting 
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 847-48 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). 
174 See N. Y. State Dep 't of Law, 984 F.2d at 1212 (describing consent decree under which 
regulated telephone companies accused of overcharges agreed to make "voluntary" 
contributions to the U.S. Treasury in lieu of forfeitures). 
175 See Schering, 779 F.2d at 685. 
176 See Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1029 (describing agreements in which 
agency settled with animal feed operations on terms that required operations to help fund 
study and to permit facilities to be monitored in the study); Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 
at 457 (stating that agency agreed to settle on terms that required natural gas vendors to 
determine whether there was demand for increased capacity, and, if so, to make that 
capacity available to customers). 
177 Thus, the court has applied the presumption when the settlement followed agency 
initiation of enforcement proceedings, see N. Y. State Dep 't of Law, 984 F.2d at 1212, when 
the settlement preceded any proceedings, see Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d at 1035, 
and when the settlement followed a declaratory judgment action by a regulated entity, see 
Schering, 779 F.2d at 684-85. 
178 By applying the presumption, courts have often avoided the standing issue. For 
instance, in Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 484 F .3d 1027, the agency disputed challengers' 
standing to contest a settlement, but the D.C. Circuit held that the presumption of 
nonreviewability deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1030-31. The court 
thus disposed of the standing claim in a footnote: "Although petitioners ' standing was also 
challenged, this court is not bound to consider jurisdictional questions in any particular 
order." Id. at 1030 n.1. 
179 Because the presumption is rebuttable, limited potential for third-party actions 
remains. Heckler v. Chaney makes it clear that Congress may limit an agency's 
enforcement decision. 470 U.S. 821 , 832-33 (1985). For an application of the exception, 
see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 , 25 (1998) (holding that where the agency' s decision not to 
enforce a disclosure requirement against a particular organization rested, even in part, on a 
misconstruction of statutory language, voters could challenge the agency's interpretation of 
the language, and hence the agency's decision not to enforce). But the D.C. Circuit, in 
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Unfortunately, the analogy between settlement of land use litigation and 
settlement of federal agency litigation is imperfect. First, federal agency 
officials typically have more information at their disposal than do municipal 
officials. Federal agencies are staffed by well-trained, full-time officials. 
Local zoning officials, by contrast, are often lay volunteers dependent on the 
parties they regulate for critical information. 180 As a result, permitting 
unrestrained settlement raises concerns not present in the federal agency 
context. 
Second, federal agencies do not depend on political participation for their 
legitimacy. Instead, agencies are accountable to the political branches of the 
federal govemment. 181 Within the Madisonian framework, the wide range of 
issues and the need for each interest group to build coalitions prevents 
domination of the political branches by any single faction. 182 Municipal 
zoning officials, by contrast, do not enjoy comparable insulation from faction; 
wide and visible participation by constituents may function as a substitute 
mechanism for building legitimacy. Allowing officials to settle litigation 
without input from the parties who prevailed before the relevant zoning agency 
threatens to undermine that legitimacy. 
settlement cases, has been careful to assure that no statute operated to rebut the presumption 
of nonreviewability. See, e.g., Ass 'n of Irritated Residents, 494 F.3d. at I 032; Bait. Gas & 
E/ec. Co., 252 F.3d at 460 ("Nowhere does the act place an affirmative obligation on FERC 
to initiate an enforcement action, nor does it impose limitations on FERC's discretion to 
settle such an action."). 
180 A number of states have enacted mandatory training programs for local zoning 
officials out of recognition that most decisions are made by inexperienced volunteers 
unfamiliar with the issues they are required to address. See Anthony J. Samson, A Proposal 
to Implement Mandatory Training Requirements for Home Rule Zoning Officials, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 879, 881-82, 897-98. 
181 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260-61 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1809-14 (2007) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court's cases can be understood as establishing a set of 
mutual political checks, by Congress and the President, on agency action); Mark Seidenfeld, 
Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 Omo 
ST. L.J. 251,298 (2009). 
182 In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison, after discussing the evils of democratic 
government within a small territory, wrote: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it 
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for 
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. & Martino 
Publ'g spec. ed. 2001) (1788). 
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B. The Representation-Reieforcing Approach: Public Hearings as a 
Safeguard 
263 
One way to address the information and participation deficit generated by an 
approach that permits unrestrained settlement would be to require that 
municipal officials conduct public hearings on proposed settlements, and vote 
to approve those settlements only at the close of the public hearing. Once the 
municipal body concludes the hearing and approves the settlement, litigation 
challenging the settlement would be foreclosed. Indeed, three New Jersey 
lawyers, two of them judges, proposed such an approach about fifteen years 
ago.183 
Like the unrestrained settlement approach, requiring public hearings as a 
safeguard finds an analog in federal administrative law. When a regulated 
party challenges an agency rule that was the product of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, a settlement that resulted in a change in the rule would require a 
second round in the notice-and-comment process. 184 Moreover, liberal 
standing rules for challenges to administrative rules limit the finality of 
settlement. 185 
Within the agency context, at least two factors mitigate any disincentive to 
settlement created by the requirement that rules developed within a settlement 
be subjected to notice-and-comment procedures. First, because the agency's 
professional staff will typically have greater capacity to assess the 
consequences of settlement than will local officials, the likelihood is smaller 
that facts will emerge in the notice-and-comment process that would lead the 
agency to upset the settlement. Second, and more important, the agency that 
183 Richard S. Cohen, Douglas K. Wolfson & Kathleen Meehan DalCortivo, Settling 
Land Use Litigation While Protecting the Public Interest: Whose Lawsuit is this Anyway?, 
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 844, 868-71 (1993). 
184 The Supreme Court has held that an agency may not repeal a rule promulgated 
through the notice and comment process without going through the same notice and 
comment process. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement 
Agreement, 73 GEO L.J. 1241, 1245-46 (1985); Rossi, supra note 160, at 1051 (explaining 
that judicial and executive review "helps to ensure that the public interest is not skirted 
through a rulemaking settlement and its implementation"). Professor Rossi argues, 
however, that in some cases an agency may circumvent notice and comment requirements 
by adopting interpretive rules or policy statements not subject to APA review. Id. at 1055. 
185 Article Ill's case or controversy requirement places limits on the power of a public 
citizen to challenge administrative rules unless the litigant can show concrete and 
particularized injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). But 
the D.C. Circuit has held that the Chamber of Commerce has standing to challenge the 
SEC's regulation of mutual funds because it invested in, and wanted to continue to invest in, 
funds not governed in accordance with the SEC's rule. Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 896-97, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006). For discussion of 
standing rules more generally, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in 
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1275-85 (1989). 
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agrees to the settlement is the same agency that will conduct the rulemaking 
process and promulgate the new rule. 186 By contrast, in the land use process, 
the division of authority among local boards means that the public hearing, and 
the decision following the hearing, will often be made by a group of lay 
officials who played no role in the settlement negotiation. From the 
developer's standpoint, the disparity in parties increases the risk - and 
decreases the value - of settlement. 
Within the land use context, a number of problems suggest that a public 
hearing requirement offers no panacea. First, what presumptions would 
surround the public hearing? If the hearing were designed to be largely a 
rubber stamp of a settlement already reached, the hearing would serve little 
purpose. But if the hearing were designed to give serious consideration to 
substantive objections to a settlement, the prospect of public hearings would 
generate a strong disincentive to settlement. A developer considering whether 
to settle rather than litigate would discount the value of settlement to reflect 
two unattractive alternatives: (1) the municipality might disapprove the 
settlement entirely after conducting the hearing; and (2) the municipality might 
condition approval of the settlement on additional concessions by the 
developer - resulting in the need for additional negotiations and, perhaps, 
public hearings. 
Second, a public hearing requirement inevitably opens the settlement 
process to attack on the grounds that the hearing was inadequate. That is, 
aggrieved neighbors might allege that the municipality provided inadequate 
notice of the hearing, or rely on other procedural inadequacies. If courts or 
legislatures were to impose a hearing requirement on municipal decision 
makers, it would be difficult to justify precluding aggrieved citizens from 
attacking settlements for failure to comply with the mandated procedures. 
The problem, then, is that if settlements could be insulated from subsequent 
attack only if the municipality conducted a serious public hearing addressed to 
the merits of the settlement, developers would not be significantly more likely 
to settle than they are under current law, which typically conditions settlements 
on the municipality's compliance with statutory or common law procedures for 
amending ordinances or granting variances or permits - procedures which 
generally require public hearings. 
Conversely, if the municipality were required only to conduct a pro forma 
public hearing on the settlement, but were contractually ( or perhaps even 
morally) bound to abide by the settlement agreement, the public hearing 
186 Another factor mitigating any disincentive to settlement is the challenger's belief that 
it might have more influence in crafting a new rule as part of the settlement process than it 
might have in the more open notice-and-comment process that would arise after judicial 
invalidation of the original rule. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: 
Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & Soc'y REv. 735, 757 
(1996); Rossi, supra note 160, at 1029-30. 
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requirement will not reduce the agency costs that generated the hearing 
requirement in the first place. The result, therefore, is that a public hearing 
requirement offers little promise for resolving the settlement dilemma. 
C. Judicial Approval: The "Consent Decree" Approach 
A third approach to settlement would rely on judicial approval of the 
settlement as a mechanism for precluding subsequent attacks on the settlement. 
This approach would effectively transform a settlement of land use litigation 
into a "consent decree" common in other areas of public law litigation. Once 
litigation begins, if parties choose to settle, they could seek judicial approval of 
the settlement. The court would then review the terms of the settlement -
perhaps after conducting a "fairness" hearing - and judicial approval would 
preclude non-parties from challenging the settlement. 187 
Consent decrees have become common in federal court challenges to local 
zoning laws, particularly when the challenge alleges housing discrimination in 
violation of federal law. 188 In recent years, some states have permitted 
developers and municipalities to use the consent decree approach in ways that 
would permit the litigating parties to bypass state law procedural 
requirements. 189 
The consent decree approach removes some of the uncertainty of the 
representation-reinforcing approach, and therefore makes settlement more 
attractive. One would expect that, especially over time, judicial reaction to 
settlement agreements would become predictable - or at least considerably 
more predictable than the reaction of elected officials after contentious public 
hearings - making it possible for settling parties to account for judicial 
reactions at the time they structure their settlements. 190 Moreover, subsequent 
attacks on judicially-approved settlements are far less likely to be successful 
than subsequent attacks on settlements reached without judicial imprimatur. 191 
187 See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 321, 322 (1988) (discussing two critical features of consent decrees, the fairness 
hearing and the "collateral attack bar"). 
188 See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 
(E.D. La. 2009). 
189 See, e.g., City of Torrington v. Zoning Comm'n of Harwinton, 806 A.2d 1020, 1024 
(Conn. 2002). But see David L. Callies, The Use of Consent Decrees in Settling Land Use 
and Environmental Disputes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 871, 885 (1992) (concluding that, as of 
1992, "[s]tate courts appear less likely to permit consent decrees that adversely affect local 
zoning and environmental laws"). 
190 See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An 
Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 62-63 (1999). 
191 See Kramer, supra note 187, at 322. 
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While making settlement easier, judicial review also addresses some of the 
agency costs that play central roles in the plan and public choice models. 192 If 
we typically trust courts to police municipal officials who would too readily 
depart from a rational plan (the plan model) or who would collude too readily 
with dominant factions (the public choice model), the consent decree approach 
holds out promise not present with the representation-reinforcing approach. 
Nevertheless, the consent decree approach is not without its problems. First, 
a court has limited information on which to evaluate the proposed consent 
decree. 193 The municipality and the developer both support the decree, and are 
unlikely to make a case for setting it aside. 194 Inviting neighbors ( or the public 
at large) to participate in a "fairness" hearing might augment the information 
available to the court, but collective action problems might limit neighbor 
participation. 195 
Second, even if a court has multiple perspectives on the consent decree, the 
court faces another problem: how should it deal with that information? The 
only formal parties to the proceeding are the developer and the municipality. 
A court has no basis for superimposing its own views on the parties or for 
mediating a dispute between parties and non-parties; 196 at most, it can decide to 
condition its approval of the consent decree on changes in the agreed-upon 
terms. That, however, sends the parties back to the bargaining table, and if 
courts take that approach too often, the results will be to make settlement more 
costly. 
Finally, if a court were to issue consent decrees based only on the request of 
the developer and the municipality, the court would be treating neighbors and 
members of the public only as information sources, not as right-bearing 
individuals. That is, to be of significant value, the consent decree would cut 
off the legal rights of neighbors without their permission, and without any 
adjudication of the merits of their legal position.197 By contrast, if the 
municipality had approved a developer's proposal before the start of any 
litigation, the neighbors would have had standing to challenge the approval. 
The effect of the consent decree, then, would be to preclude neighbors from 
192 See Weisburst, supra note 190, at 58-59 (discussing judicial review of settlements as 
a response to inadequate representation). 
193 Judith Resnick, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 101; Weisburst, supra 
note 190, at 64. 
194 Fiss, supra note l 0, at 1082. 
195 Weisburst, supra note 190, at 65-66. 
196 Cf Kramer, supra note 187, at 353-55 (observing that third parties cannot force 
adjudication of a claim if two parties wish to settle; at best, a third party can bring a separate 
action to enforce its own rights). 
197 As Larry Kramer notes, consent decrees also have the potential to lower the cost of 
enforcement of a settlement agreement. See id. at 326. That advantage is often of little 
importance in the land use context because once the project has been approved and 
completed, no further issues are likely to generate any need for enforcement of the 
settlement agreement. 
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raising legal issues that they previously had standing to raise, even though they 
were not parties to the proceeding that cut off their rights. That result is in 
tension with foundational principles of claim preclusion. 198 It is also entirely 
inconsistent with the mediation model of land use regulation; neighbors who 
negotiated - successfully - for a particular result before municipal officials 
now find themselves excluded from any participation in a settlement that 
materially changes the result of their negotiation. 
D. The Participation Approach 
Perhaps the most promising approach to facilitating settlement would give 
neighbors and other aggrieved parties the opportunity to participate in the 
proceeding between the developer and the municipality, and to preclude 
subsequent attack on any settlement by parties who choose not to participate. 
This approach builds, of necessity, on the consent decree approach, because 
without some form of judicial imprimatur, there would be no basis for binding 
non-participants to any settlement. 199 The bar to subsequent attacks would 
create certainty for the parties not generally available under current doctrine, 
and therefore make settlement more attractive than current law. At the same 
time, because participating neighbors would become parties to the litigation, 
they would have to consent to any settlement. For this reason, a participation-
based approach would be most consistent with the mediation models of land 
use regulation. 
A developer could join neighbors and other potential objectors as defendants 
in a suit against a municipality, but such joinder presents conceptual 
difficulties because the developer is not seeking relief from those parties; 
instead, the developer typically wants the municipality to rescind or modify its 
198 Id. at 331-38. 
199 Id. at 331. 
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action. 200 Doctrinally, the more promising avenue is to permit neighbors to 
intervene in the action between the developer and the municipality.201 
Giving neighbors a right to intervene would be of little value if the 
neighbors did not have notice of the litigation. To be effective as a device for 
promoting participation-based settlement, the developer would have to provide 
notice. Due process typically requires adequate notice to a party of a judicial 
proceeding when that proceeding would bar that party's legal claims.202 
Notice would therefore have to be provided to all potential parties who would 
otherwise have standing to challenge the municipality's decision to settle. But 
standing in land use cases is often fuzzy, making it difficult for a municipality 
or developer to be sure that they have provided personal notice to every person 
who might have standing.203 Ultimately, however, it would seem adequate to 
200 The rules surrounding joinder of parties vary among the states. Rule 20 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, used as a model in some states, permits joinder of persons as 
defendants "if there is asserted against them ... any right to relief" FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
Rule 19, which deals with mandatory joinder, requires joinder when a person claiming an 
interest is so situated that adjudicating a claim in the person's absence would "as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or []leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
The language of that provision might be broad enough to cover neighbors in a zoning or 
other land use dispute, but such a broad reading would require joinder in every dispute, 
generating significant costs even when neighbors would have little interest in participating. 
See Kramer, supra note 187, at 337-38 ("There will almost certainly be third parties who do 
not care enough about the adverse effects of a consent decree to initiate litigation but who 
will litigate once they have been made parties to an ongoing lawsuit. There is no reason to 
encourage such litigation."). 
201 For comparison purposes, Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits 
intervention to any person who "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." FED. 
R. Clv. P. 24(a). Dean Kramer has noted that parties subject to the collateral attack bar 
associated with consent decrees have had little difficulty satisfying Rule 24's requirements. 
Kramer, supra note 187, at 339-41. 
202 As the Supreme Court said in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306 (1950): "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314; see also Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 
234 (2006) (requiring adequate notice of tax sale of landowner's property); Mennonite Bd. 
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) ("Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally 
protected property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a 
pending tax sale."). 
203 For instance, community and environmental groups sometimes have standing to 
challenge zoning or environmental regulations. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, lnc. v. 
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provide personal notice to all parties entitled, by statute, to notice of the zoning 
actions necessary to implement the settlement, and to provide notice by 
publication to the rest of the municipality.204 
A developer who had no intention of settling would not be required to 
provide notice to neighbors or to trigger intervention rights. As a result, 
neighbors would not have to incur the costs associated with intervention except 
in those cases where the developer has signaled a willingness to settle, and 
where the neighbors fear that the municipality will not adequately reflect their 
interests in settlement negotiations. 
Of course, this intervention approach entails collective action problems.205 
No individual neighbor may find it worth her while to intervene in legal 
proceedings, and free rider problems may prevent organized intervention by 
neighbors. Ultimately, however, this problem seems less serious because 
precisely the same collective action problems exist when neighbors try to 
challenge a settlement in a collateral proceeding - the only right they would 
lose by failing to intervene. If neighbors would be unable to overcome those 
collective action problems to intervene when settlement is proposed, they 
would probably be equally unable to overcome them by challenging the 
settlement in a collateral proceeding. 
Another objection to the intervention approach focuses on timing: when 
should neighbors be required to intervene in order to preserve a right to object 
to any settlement? Requiring intervention as soon as the developer challenges 
municipal action requires an expenditure by neighbors at a time when they 
have reason to believe municipal officials adequately represent their 
interests. 206 On the other hand, permitting the neighbors to intervene after they 
learn of the settlement reduces somewhat the incentive of the developer and 
the municipality to settle, because the investment in settlement will be for 
Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917, 918 (N.Y. 2009). It would be practically 
impossible for a developer to provide notice to every potential environmental or community 
group with standing to challenge a development proposal. 
204 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62.l (West 2008). In other jurisdictions, by 
contrast, publication is the only notice required for land use changes. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T 
CODE § 65090 (West 2010). In those jurisdictions where law requires neighbors to be alert 
to publication, the same notices should suffice for intervention purposes. 
205 See Weisburst, supra note 190, at 65-66. 
206 See St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. County of Franklin, No. 4:09CV987-DJS, 2010 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 16948, at *15-16 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2010) (upholding right to intervene at the 
time settlement is reached, stating that intervenors had no right to intervene "while the 
County and BZA continued to adequately represent their interests"). 
Connecticut has a process for judicial approval of settlements (essentially the consent 
decree approach), but the Connecticut courts have held that neighbors have a right to 
intervene during the approval process. See Diamond 67, LLC v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm'n of Vernon, 978 A.2d 122, 129-30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); see also Kramer, supra 
note 187, at 342 (suggesting that time limitation on intervention should not run until a third 
party "knew or should have known that his interests were threatened"). 
270 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 227 
naught if neighbors object at the eleventh hour.207 On balance, a rule requiring 
the neighbors to protect their interest by relatively "quiet" intervention -
participation as a nominal party - would not seem unduly burdensome. 208 
Either alternative, however, avoids the delays the developer endures under 
prevailing doctrine in many jurisdictions - delays attendant to collateral 
litigation brought by neighbors after final resolution of the dispute between the 
municipality and the developer. 
The intervention approach does not eliminate disincentives to settlement. If 
the neighbors intervene, and are sufficiently obstinate, they can effectively 
force the municipality and the developer to litigate to final judgment, perhaps 
even to appellate courts. Faced with that prospect, the developer and the 
municipality would have reasons to forego an investment of resources in 
settlement negotiations. But in many cases, neighbors will not intervene, 
clearing a path for developers and the municipality to negotiate a settlement. 
Even when neighbors do intervene, the chances for settlement are not 
necessarily smaller than a doctrinal framework that does not provide for 
intervention, but leaves any settlement open to neighbor challenge. In the 
current no-intervention framework, reaching an agreement with the 
municipality may be easier than in a regime that permits intervention, but the 
settlement will be of less value to the developer because of the prospect that 
neighbors will delay the project by bringing collateral litigation challenging the 
settlement. An intervention regime would eliminate the costs and delays 
associated with collateral litigation. 
Making mediation available to the parties might further increase the 
likelihood of settlement. Multi-party mediation of public policy issues has 
become more common in recent years. 209 Once neighbors have decided to 
intervene in a proceeding brought by the developer, they have little to lose by 
seeking mediation of the dispute; any mediated settlement will require their 
207 See T.H. Props., L.P. v. Upper Salford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 970 A.2d 495, 500 
(Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 2009) (holding that intervention had come too late because intervenor "or 
other interested residents could have petitioned to intervene when the land use appeal was 
filed or when the Board authorized settlement negotiations"). 
208 Professor Kramer has suggested that measuring the timeliness of a motion to 
intervene from a starting point before the consent decree is entered would violate due 
process. Kramer, supra note 187, at 344. That argument, however, is problematic in the 
land use context. Certainly, state law would be free to deny standing to neighbors to 
challenge municipal decisions to approve development projects, concluding that municipal 
officials adequately represent neighbor interests. In light of that possibility, it is hard to see 
how the state could violate due process by embracing a more limited rule giving those 
neighbors standing, but requiring them to assert any rights as soon as litigation between the 
developer and the municipality commences. 
209 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New 
Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63, 73 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not 
the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. 
U. J.L. & PoL'Y 37, 52-53 (2002). 
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consent,210 and they may be able to negotiate a settlement that leaves them 
better off than the likely result of litigation. The prospect of a mediated and 
binding settlement, avoiding the prospect of collateral litigation, will, in turn, 
make negotiation and mediation more attractive to the developer.211 
Implementing an intervention-based system would, in most jurisdictions, 
require legislative action. The scope of any legislation, however, would vary 
depending on current law within the jurisdiction. At a minimum, however, 
legislation would have to provide explicitly that failure to intervene would 
preclude parties from collaterally attacking settlement of a litigation in which 
the party could have intervened - a change from existing preclusion law in 
most jurisdictions. Explicit language overriding public hearing or 
environmental review requirements might also be necessary or desirable. This 
approach appears to provide the best alternative for promoting settlement 
without risking other significant land use values. 
CONCLUSION 
In most jurisdictions, current doctrine limits the power of a municipality to 
settle land use disputes without attaching conditions that reduce the value of 
settlement to developers. As a result, more land use litigation proceeds to 
judgment than would be the case in a regime that permitted free settlement. 
Although the prevailing regime would appear inefficient in a world without 
agency costs, the structure of land use law generally recognizes that agency 
costs are a matter of significant concern. Some models of land use law fear 
that municipal officials will be captured by dominant interest groups, and value 
litigation as a check on capture. Within these models, giving municipal 
officials -unconstrained power to settle litigation will not significantly 
undermine the value of litigation as a check on official behavior. Within the 
mediation model of land use regulation, a model that treats municipal officials 
as mediators in disputes between developers and neighbors, unconstrained 
settlement presents information and legitimacy problems, because settlement 
threatens to leave one relevant interest group - and the information it might 
bring to the table - out of the settlement process. 
Even though some constraints on settlement of land use disputes may be 
necessary in light of information and legitimacy concerns, there is little reason 
210 See Goldfien, supra note 159, at 449 (commenting that one of the advantages of 
mediation is that parties can discuss issues in the absence of "the imminent threat of an 
adverse decision hanging over the proceedings"). 
211 Another alternative, a close cousin to mediation, is a "consensus building" approach. 
Rather than insisting that all parties agree on each aspect of a proposal, the consensus 
building approach first has the parties agree to abide by a near-unanimity rule. With such an 
approach, all parties have an incentive to compromise to obtain the requisite consensus, 
without fear that a single holdout will block consensus. See Lawrence Susskind, 
Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 395, 401-
02 (2009). 
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to assume that the set of constraints imposed by current doctrine are optimal. 
In particular, information and legitimacy concerns would best be addressed by 
requiring parties who might object to a settlement to intervene in the litigation 
between developer and municipality rather than retaining the right to challenge 
any settlement in collateral litigation. 
